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The Stromata, or Miscellanies

Clement of Alexandria

Book 1 · Chapter 8

About this work

A wide-ranging collection on faith, knowledge, philosophy, Scripture, ethics, and Christian maturity that intentionally mixes subjects while portraying the ideal Christian knower formed through disciplined inquiry.

Author: Clement of Alexandria
Date: c. AD 195–215
Origin: Alexandria
Genre: Theological Treatise

Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.

But the art of sophistry, which the

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Greeks

cultivated

,

is

a

fantastic

power

,

which

makes

false

opinions

like

true

by

means

of

words

.

For

it

produces

rhetoric

in

order

to

persuasion

,

and

disputation

for

wrangling

.

These

arts

,

therefore

,

if

not

conjoined

with

philosophy

,

will

be

injurious

to

every

one

.

For

Plato

openly

called

sophistry

“

an

evil

art

.

”

And

Aristotle

,

following

him

,

demonstrates

it

to

be

a

dishonest

art

,

which

abstracts

in

a

specious

manner

the

whole

business

of

wisdom

,

and

professes

a

wisdom

which

it

has

not

studied

.

To

speak

briefly

,

as

the

beginning

of

rhetoric

is

the

probable

,

and

an

attempted

proof

the

process

,

and

the

end

persuasion

,

so

the

beginning

of

disputation

is

what

is

matter

of

opinion

,

and

the

process

a

contest

,

and

the

end

victory

.

For

in

the

same

manner

,

also

,

the

beginning

of

sophistry

is

the

apparent

,

and

the

process

twofold

;

one

of

rhetoric

,

continuous

and

exhaustive

;

and

the

other

of

logic

,

and

is

interrogatory

.

And

its

end

is

admiration

.

The dialectic in vogue in the schools, on the other hand, is the exercise of a philosopher in matters of opinion, for the sake of the faculty of disputation. But truth is not in these at all. With reason, therefore, the noble apostle, depreciating these superfluous arts occupied about words, says, “If any man do not give heed to wholesome words, but is puffed up by a kind of teaching, knowing nothing, but doting (νοσῶν) about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh contention, envy, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds, destitute of the truth.”

You see how he is moved against them, calling their art of logic—on which, those to whom this garrulous mischievous art is dear, whether Greeks or barbarians, plume themselves—a disease (νοσος). Very beautifully, therefore, the tragic poet Euripides says in the Phœnissæ,—

“But a wrongful speech Is diseased in itself, and needs skilful medicines.”

For the saving Word is called “wholesome,” He being the truth; and what is wholesome (healthful) remains ever deathless. But separation from what is healthful and divine is impiety, and a deadly malady. These are rapacious wolves hid in sheep-skins, men-stealers, and glozing soul-seducers, secretly, but proved to be robbers; striving by fraud and force to catch us who are unsophisticated and have less power of speech.

“Often a man, impeded through want of words, carries less weight In expressing what is right, than the man of eloquence. But now in fluent mouths the weightiest truths They disguise, so that they do not seem what they ought to seem,”

says the tragedy. Such are these wranglers, whether they follow the sects, or practice miserable dialectic arts. These are they that “stretch the warp and weave nothing,” says the Scripture; prosecuting a bootless task, which the apostle has called “cunning craftiness of men whereby they lie in wait to deceive.” “For there are,” he says, “many unruly and vain talkers and deceivers.” Wherefore it was not said to all, “Ye are the salt of the earth.” For there are some even of the hearers of the word who are like the fishes of the sea, which, reared from their birth in brine, yet need salt to dress them for food. Accordingly I wholly approve of the tragedy, when it says:—

“O son, false words can be well spoken, And truth may be vanquished by beauty of words. But this is not what is most correct, but nature and what is right; He who practices eloquence is indeed wise, But I consider deeds always better than words.”

We must not, then, aspire to please the multitude. For we do not practice what will please them, but what we know is remote from their disposition. “Let us not be desirous of vainglory,” says the apostle, “provoking one another, envying one another.”

Thus the truth-loving Plato says, as if divinely inspired, “Since I am such as to obey nothing but the word, which, after reflection, appears to me the best.”

Accordingly he charges those who credit opinions without intelligence and knowledge, with abandoning right and sound reason unwarrantably, and believing him who is a partner in falsehood. For to cheat one’s self of the truth is bad; but to speak the truth, and to hold as our opinions positive realities, is good.

Men are deprived of what is good unwillingly. Nevertheless they are deprived either by being deceived or beguiled, or by being compelled and not believing. He who believes not, has already made himself a willing captive; and he who changes his persuasion is cozened, while he forgets that time imperceptibly takes away some things, and reason others. And after an opinion has been entertained, pain and anguish, and on the other hand contentiousness and anger, compel. Above all, men are beguiled who are either bewitched by pleasure or terrified by fear. And all these are voluntary changes, but by none of these will knowledge ever be attained.

Notes

88
ἐπιχειρημα.
89
1 Tim. vi. 3–5. [He treats the sophists with Platonic scorn, but adopts St. Paul’s enlarged idea of sophistry.]
90
Phœnissæ, 471, 472.
91
[He has no idea of salvation by any other name, though he regards Gentile illumination as coming through philosophy.]
92
Where, nobody knows.
93
Eph. iv. 14.
94
Tit. i. 10.
95
Matt. v. 13.
96
Gal. v. 26.
97
Plato, Crito, vi. p. 46.