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A Treatise on the Anger of God Addressed to Donatus

Lactantius

Chapter 7

About this work

A philosophical and theological argument that divine anger is compatible with divine goodness because providence, moral law, reward, and punishment require God’s active concern for human conduct.

Author: Lactantius
Date: Early 4th century
Origin: North Africa or Nicomedia
Genre: Theological Treatise

Chap. VII.—Of Man, and the Brute Animals, and Religion.

Though philosophers have often turned aside from

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reason

through

their

ignorance

of

the

truth

,

and

have

fallen

into

inextricable

errors

(

for

that

is

wont

to

happen

to

these

which

happens

to

a

traveller

ignorant

of

the

way

,

and

not

confessing

that

he

is

ignorant

,

—

namely

,

that

he

wanders

about

,

while

he

is

ashamed

to

inquire

from

those

whom

he

meets

)

,

no

philosopher

,

however

,

has

ever

made

the

assertion

that

there

is

no

difference

between

man

and

the

brutes

.

Nor

has

any

one

at

all

,

provided

that

he

wished

to

appear

wise

,

reduced

a

rational

animal

to

the

level

of

the

mute

and

irrational

;

which

some

ignorant

persons

do

,

resembling

the

brutes

themselves

,

who

,

wishing

to

give

themselves

up

to

the

indulgence

of

their

appetite

and

pleasure

,

say

that

they

are

born

on

the

same

principle

as

all

living

animals

,

which

it

is

impious

for

man

to

say

.

For

who

is

so

unlearned

as

not

to

know

,

who

is

so

void

of

understanding

as

not

to

perceive

,

that

there

is

something

divine

in

man

?

I

do

not

as

yet

come

to

the

excellences

of

the

soul

and

of

the

intellect

,

by

which

there

is

a

manifest

affinity

between

man

and

God

.

Does

not

the

position

of

the

body

itself

,

and

the

fashion

of

the

countenance

,

declare

that

we

are

not

on

a

level

with

the

dumb

creation

?

Their

nature

is

prostrated

to

the

ground

and

to

their

pasture

,

and

has

nothing

in

common

with

the

heaven

,

which

they

do

not

look

upon

.

But

man

,

with

his

erect

position

,

with

his

elevated

countenance

raised

to

the

contemplation

of

the

universe

,

compares

his

features

with

God

,

and

reason

recognises

reason

.

And on this account there is no animal, as Cicero says, except man, which has any knowledge of God. For he alone is furnished with wisdom, so that he alone understands religion; and this is the chief or only difference between man and the dumb animals. For the other things which appear to be peculiar to man, even if there are not such in the dumb animals, nevertheless may appear to be similar. Speech is peculiar to man; yet even in these there is a certain resemblance to speech. For they both distinguish one another by their voices; and when they are angry, they send forth a sound resembling altercation; and when they see one another after an interval of time, they show the office of congratulation by their voice. To us, indeed, their voices appear uncouth, as ours perhaps do to them; but to themselves, who understand one another, they are words. In short, in every affection they utter distinct expressions of voice by which they may show their state of mind. Laughter also is peculiar to man; and yet we see certain indications of joy in other animals, when they use passionate gestures with a view to sports, hang down their ears, contract their mouth, smooth their forehead, relax their eyes to sportiveness. What is so peculiar to man as reason and the foreseeing of the future? But there are animals which open several outlets in different directions from their lairs, that if any danger comes upon them, an escape may be open for them shut in; but they would not do this unless they possessed intelligence and reflection. Others are provident for the future, as

“Ants, when they plunder a great heap of corn, mindful of the winter, and lay it up in their dwelling;”

again,—

“As bees, which alone know a country and fixed abodes; and mindful of the winter which is to come, they practice labour in the summer, and lay up their gains as a common stock.”

It would be a long task if I should wish to trace out the things most resembling the skill of man, which are accustomed to be done by the separate tribes of animals. But if, in the case of all these things which are wont to be ascribed to man, there is found to be some resemblance even in the dumb animals, it is evident that religion is the only thing of which no trace can be found in the dumb animals, nor any indication. For justice is peculiar to religion, and to this no other animal attains. For man alone bears rule; the other animals are subjected to him. But the worship of God is ascribed to justice; and he who does not embrace this, being far removed from the nature of man, will live the life of the brutes under the form of man. But since we differ from the other animals almost in this respect alone, that we alone of all perceive the divine might and power, while in the others there is no understanding of God, it is surely impossible that in this respect either the dumb animals should have more wisdom, or human nature should be unwise, since all living creatures, and the whole system of nature, are subject to man on account of his wisdom. Wherefore if reason, if the force of man in this respect, excels and surpasses the rest of living creatures, inasmuch as he alone is capable of the knowledge of God, it is evident that religion can in no way be overthrown.

Notes

1
The reason of man, man’s rational nature, recognizes the divine reason, i.e., God. [Confert cum Deo vultum et rationem ratio cognoscit. Hence Milton’s “human face divine.”]
2
De Legibus, i. 8.
3
Incondita, “unformed, or rude.” [See p. 77, supra.]
4
[Vol. vi. note 3, p. 452, this series.]
5
Ad lusum gestiunt.
6
Demulcent.
7
Virg., Æn., iv. 402.
8
Virg., Georg., iv. 155.
9
Conciliata sunt.