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The Divine Institutes

Lactantius

Book 5 · Chapter 15

About this work

A large Latin presentation of Christian teaching that criticizes pagan religion and philosophy while treating justice, God, creation, Christ, worship, ethics, and the final destiny of humanity.

Author: Lactantius
Date: c. AD 303–311
Origin: North Africa and Nicomedia
Genre: Apology

Chap. XV.—Of Folly, Wisdom, Piety, Equity, and Justice.

But the reason on account of which they imagine

‹ Book 5 · Chapter 14 Book 5 · Chapter 16 ›

those

who

are

wise

to

be

foolish

has

strong

grounds

of

support

(

for

they

are

not

deceived

without

reason

)

.

And

this

must

be

diligently

explained

by

us

,

that

they

may

at

length

(

if

it

is

possible

)

recognise

their

errors

.

Justice

by

its

own

nature

has

a

certain

appearance

of

folly

,

and

I

am

able

to

confirm

this

both

by

divine

and

human

testimonies

.

But

perhaps

we

should

not

succeed

with

them

,

unless

we

should

teach

them

from

their

own

authorities

that

no

one

can

be

just

,

a

matter

which

is

united

with

true

wisdom

,

unless

he

also

appears

to

be

foolish

.

Carneades

was

a

philosopher

of

the

Academic

sect

;

and

one

who

knows

not

what

power

he

had

in

discussion

,

what

eloquence

,

what

sagacity

,

will

nevertheless

understand

the

character

of

the

man

himself

from

the

praises

of

Cicero

or

of

Lucilius

,

in

whose

writings

Neptune

,

discoursing

on

a

subject

of

the

greatest

difficulty

,

shows

that

it

cannot

be

explained

,

even

if

Orcus

should

restore

Carneades

himself

to

life

.

This

Carneades

,

when

he

had

been

sent

by

the

Athenians

as

ambassador

to

Rome

,

disputed

copiously

on

the

subject

of

justice

,

in

the

hearing

of

Galba

and

Cato

,

who

had

been

censor

,

who

were

at

that

time

the

greatest

of

orators

.

But

on

the

next

day

the

same

man

overthrew

his

own

argument

by

a

disputation

to

the

contrary

effect

,

and

took

away

the

justice

which

he

had

praised

on

the

preceding

day

,

not

indeed

with

the

gravity

of

a

philosopher

,

whose

prudence

ought

to

be

firm

and

his

opinion

settled

,

but

as

it

were

by

an

oratorical

kind

of

exercise

of

disputing

on

both

sides

.

And

he

was

accustomed

to

do

this

,

that

he

might

be

able

to

refute

others

who

asserted

anything

.

L

.

Furius

,

in

Cicero

,

makes

mention

of

that

discussion

in

which

justice

is

overthrown

.

I

believe

,

inasmuch

as

he

was

discussing

the

subject

of

the

state

,

he

did

it

that

he

might

introduce

the

defence

and

praise

of

that

without

which

he

thought

that

a

state

could

not

be

governed

.

But

Carneades

,

that

he

might

refute

Aristotle

and

Plato

,

the

advocates

of

justice

,

in

that

first

disputation

collected

all

the

arguments

which

were

alleged

in

behalf

of

justice

,

that

he

might

be

able

to

overthrow

them

,

as

he

did

.

For

it

was

very

easy

to

shake

justice

,

having

no

roots

,

inasmuch

as

there

was

then

none

on

the

earth

,

that

its

nature

or

qualities

might

be

perceived

by

philosophers

.

And

I

could

wish

that

men

,

so

many

and

of

such

a

character

,

had

possessed

knowledge

also

,

in

proportion

to

their

eloquence

and

spirit

,

for

completing

the

defence

of

this

greatest

virtue

,

which

has

its

origin

in

religion

,

its

principle

in

equity

!

But

those

who

were

ignorant

of

that

first

part

could

not

possess

the

second

.

But

I

wish

first

to

show

,

summarily

and

concisely

,

what

it

is

,

that

it

may

be

understood

that

the

philosophers

were

ignorant

of

justice

,

and

were

unable

to

defend

that

with

which

they

were

unacquainted

.

Although

justice

embraces

all

the

virtues

together

,

yet

there

are

two

,

the

chief

of

all

,

which

cannot

be

torn

asunder

and

separated

from

it

—

piety

and

equity

.

For

fidelity

,

temperance

,

uprightness

,

innocence

,

integrity

,

and

the

other

things

of

this

kind

,

either

naturally

or

through

the

training

of

parents

,

may

exist

in

those

men

who

are

ignorant

of

justice

,

as

they

have

always

existed

;

for

the

ancient

Romans

,

who

were

accustomed

to

glory

in

justice

,

used

evidently

to

glory

in

those

virtues

which

(

as

I

have

said

)

may

proceed

from

justice

,

and

be

separated

from

the

very

fountain

itself

.

But

piety

and

equity

are

,

as

it

were

,

its

veins

:

for

in

these

two

fountains

the

whole

of

justice

is

contained

;

but

its

source

and

origin

is

in

the

first

,

all

its

force

and

method

in

the

second

.

But

piety

is

nothing

else

but

the

conception

of

God

,

as

Trismegistus

most

truly

defined

it

,

as

we

have

said

in

another

place

.

If

,

therefore

,

it

is

piety

to

know

God

,

and

the

sum

of

this

knowledge

is

that

you

worship

Him

,

it

is

plain

that

he

is

ignorant

of

justice

who

does

not

possess

the

knowledge

of

God

.

For

how

can

he

know

justice

itself

,

who

is

ignorant

of

the

source

from

which

it

arises

?

Plato

,

indeed

,

spoke

many

things

respecting

the

one

God

,

by

whom

he

said

that

the

world

was

framed

;

but

he

spoke

nothing

respecting

religion

:

for

he

had

dreamed

of

God

,

but

had

not

known

Him

.

But

if

either

he

himself

or

any

other

person

had

wished

to

complete

the

defence

of

justice

,

he

ought

first

of

all

to

have

overthrown

the

religions

of

the

gods

,

because

they

are

opposed

to

piety

.

And

because

Socrates

indeed

tried

to

do

this

,

he

was

thrown

into

prison

;

that

even

then

it

might

be

seen

what

was

about

to

happen

to

those

men

who

had

begun

to

defend

true

justice

,

and

to

serve

the

only

God

.

The other part of justice, therefore, is equity; and it is plain that I am not speaking of the equity of judging well, though this also is praiseworthy in a just man, but of making himself equal to others, which Cicero calls equability. For God, who produces and gives breath to men, willed that all should be equal, that is, equally matched. He has imposed on all the same condition of living; He has produced all to wisdom; He has promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly benefits. For as He distributes to all alike His one light, sends forth His fountains to all, supplies food, and gives the most pleasant rest of sleep; so He bestows on all equity and virtue. In His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if all have the same Father, by an equal right we are all children. No one is poor in the sight of God, but he who is without justice; no one is rich, but he who is full of virtues; no one, in short, is excellent, but he who has been good and innocent; no one is most renowned, but he who has abundantly performed works of mercy; no one is most perfect, but he who has filled all the steps of virtue. Therefore neither the Romans nor the Greeks could possess justice, because they had men differing from one another by many degrees, from the poor to the rich, from the humble to the powerful; in short, from private persons to the highest authorities of kings. For where all are not equally matched, there is not equity; and inequality of itself excludes justice, the whole force of which consists in this, that it makes those equal who have by an equal lot arrived at the condition of this life.

Notes

1
[See Rep., iii. cap. 6, part iv. vol. 2, p. 300, ed. Klotz.]
2
Notio.
3
[De Officiis, i. 26; and see vol. ii. p. 421, this series.]
4
[A striking parallel to Cyprian’s saying, vol. v. note 2, p. 460, this series.]