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The Divine Institutes

Lactantius

Book 6 · Chapter 14

About this work

A large Latin presentation of Christian teaching that criticizes pagan religion and philosophy while treating justice, God, creation, Christ, worship, ethics, and the final destiny of humanity.

Author: Lactantius
Date: c. AD 303–311
Origin: North Africa and Nicomedia
Genre: Apology

Chap. XIV.—Of the Affections, and the Opinion of the Stoics Respecting Them; And of Virtue, the Vices, and Mercy.

If, therefore, mercy is a distinguished and

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excellent

gift

in

man

,

and

that

is

judged

to

be

very

good

by

the

consent

both

of

the

good

and

the

evil

,

it

appears

that

philosophers

were

far

distant

from

the

good

of

man

,

who

neither

enjoined

nor

practised

anything

of

this

kind

,

but

always

esteemed

as

a

vice

that

virtue

which

almost

holds

the

first

place

in

man

.

It

pleases

me

here

to

bring

forward

one

subject

of

philosophy

,

that

we

may

more

fully

refute

the

errors

of

those

who

call

mercy

,

desire

,

and

fear

,

diseases

of

the

soul

.

They

indeed

attempt

to

distinguish

virtues

from

vices

,

which

is

truly

a

very

easy

matter

.

For

who

cannot

distinguish

a

liberal

man

from

one

who

is

prodigal

(

as

they

do

)

,

or

a

frugal

man

from

one

who

is

mean

,

or

a

calm

man

from

one

who

is

slothful

,

or

a

cautious

man

from

one

who

is

timid

?

Because

these

things

which

are

good

have

their

limits

,

and

if

they

shall

exceed

these

limits

,

fall

into

vices

;

so

that

constancy

,

unless

it

is

undertaken

for

the

truth

,

becomes

shamelessness

.

In

like

manner

,

bravery

,

if

it

shall

undergo

certain

danger

,

without

the

compulsion

of

any

necessity

,

or

not

for

an

honourable

cause

,

is

changed

into

rashness

.

Freedom

of

speech

also

,

if

it

attack

others

rather

than

oppose

those

who

attack

it

,

is

obstinacy

.

Severity

also

,

unless

it

restrain

itself

within

the

befitting

punishments

of

the

guilty

,

becomes

savage

cruelty

.

Therefore they say, that those who appear evil do not sin of their own accord, or choose evils by preference, but that, erring through the appearance of good, they fall into evils, while they are ignorant of the distinction between good things and evil. These things are not indeed false, but they are all referred to the body. For to be frugal, or constant, or cautious, or calm, or grave, or severe, are virtues indeed, but virtues which relate to this short life. But we who despise this life have other virtues set before us, respecting which philosophers could not by any means even conjecture. Therefore they regarded certain virtues as vices, and certain vices as virtues. For the Stoics take away from man all the affections, by the impulse of which the soul is moved—desire, joy, fear, sorrow: the two former of which arise from good things, either future or present; the latter from evil things. In the same manner, they call these four (as I said) diseases, not so much inserted in us by nature as undertaken through a perverted opinion; and therefore they think that these can be eradicated, if the false notion of good and evil things is taken away. For if the wise man thinks nothing good or evil, he will neither be inflamed with desire, nor be transported with joy, nor be alarmed with fear, nor suffer his spirits to droop through sadness. We shall presently see whether they effect that which they wish, or what it is which they do effect: in the meantime their purpose is arrogant and almost mad, who think that they apply a remedy, and that they are able to strive in opposition to the force and system of nature.

Notes

1
Lapsos. [All this shows the need of an Augustine.]
2
Temporariæ. [Admirable so far as our author goes.]
3
Contrahetur.