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A Treatise on the Soul

Tertullian

Chapter 12

About this work

Author: Tertullian

Chapter XII.—Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.

In like manner the mind also, or animus, which

‹ Chapter 11 Chapter 13 ›

the

Greeks

designate

ΝΟΥΣ

,

is

taken

by

us

in

no

other

sense

than

as

indicating

that

faculty

or

apparatus

which

is

inherent

and

implanted

in

the

soul

,

and

naturally

proper

to

it

,

whereby

it

acts

,

whereby

it

acquires

knowledge

,

and

by

the

possession

of

which

it

is

capable

of

a

spontaneity

of

motion

within

itself

,

and

of

thus

appearing

to

be

impelled

by

the

mind

,

as

if

it

were

another

substance

,

as

is

maintained

by

those

who

determine

the

soul

to

be

the

moving

principle

of

the

universe

—

the

god

of

Socrates

,

Valentinus

’

“

only

-

begotten

”

of

his

father

Bythus

,

and

his

mother

Sige

.

How

confused

is

the

opinion

of

Anaxagoras

!

For

,

having

imagined

the

mind

to

be

the

initiating

principle

of

all

things

,

and

suspending

on

its

axis

the

balance

of

the

universe

;

affirming

,

moreover

,

that

the

mind

is

a

simple

principle

,

unmixed

,

and

incapable

of

admixture

,

he

mainly

on

this

very

consideration

separates

it

from

all

amalgamation

with

the

soul

;

and

yet

in

another

passage

he

actually

incorporates

it

with

the

soul

.

This

(

inconsistency

)

Aristotle

has

also

observed

:

but

whether

he

meant

his

criticism

to

be

constructive

,

and

to

fill

up

a

system

of

his

own

,

rather

than

destructive

of

the

principles

of

others

,

I

am

hardly

able

to

decide

.

As

for

himself

,

indeed

,

although

he

postpones

his

definition

of

the

mind

,

yet

he

begins

by

mentioning

,

as

one

of

the

two

natural

constituents

of

the

mind

,

that

divine

principle

which

he

conjectures

to

be

impassible

,

or

incapable

of

emotion

,

and

thereby

removes

from

all

association

with

the

soul

.

For

whereas

it

is

evident

that

the

soul

is

susceptible

of

those

emotions

which

it

falls

to

it

naturally

to

suffer

,

it

must

needs

suffer

either

by

the

mind

or

with

the

mind

.

Now

if

the

soul

is

by

nature

associated

with

the

mind

,

it

is

impossible

to

draw

the

conclusion

that

the

mind

is

impassible

;

or

again

,

if

the

soul

suffers

not

either

by

the

mind

or

with

the

mind

,

it

cannot

possibly

have

a

natural

association

with

the

mind

,

with

which

it

suffers

nothing

,

and

which

suffers

nothing

itself

.

Moreover

,

if

the

soul

suffers

nothing

by

the

mind

and

with

the

mind

,

it

will

experience

no

sensation

,

nor

will

it

acquire

any

knowledge

,

nor

will

it

undergo

any

emotion

through

the

agency

of

the

mind

,

as

they

maintain

it

will

.

For

Aristotle

makes

even

the

senses

passions

,

or

states

of

emotion

.

And

rightly

too

.

For

to

exercise

the

senses

is

to

suffer

emotion

,

because

to

suffer

is

to

feel

.

In

like

manner

,

to

acquire

knowledge

is

to

exercise

the

senses

;

and

to

undergo

emotion

is

to

exercise

the

senses

;

and

the

whole

of

this

is

a

state

of

suffering

.

But

we

see

that

the

soul

experiences

nothing

of

these

things

,

in

such

a

manner

as

that

the

mind

also

is

affected

by

the

emotion

,

by

which

,

indeed

,

and

with

which

,

all

is

effected

.

It

follows

,

therefore

,

that

the

mind

is

capable

of

admixture

,

in

opposition

to

Anaxagoras

;

and

passible

or

susceptible

of

emotion

,

contrary

to

the

opinion

of

Aristotle

.

Besides

,

if

a

separate

condition

between

the

soul

and

mind

is

to

be

admitted

,

so

that

they

be

two

things

in

substance

,

then

of

one

of

them

,

emotion

and

sensation

,

and

every

sort

of

taste

,

and

all

action

and

motion

,

will

be

the

characteristics

;

whilst

of

the

other

the

natural

condition

will

be

calm

,

and

repose

,

and

stupor

.

There

is

therefore

no

alternative

:

either

the

mind

must

be

useless

and

void

,

or

the

soul

.

But

if

these

affections

may

certainly

be

all

of

them

ascribed

to

both

,

then

in

that

case

the

two

will

be

one

and

the

same

,

and

Democritus

will

carry

his

point

when

he

suppresses

all

distinction

between

the

two

.

The

question

will

arise

how

two

can

be

one

—

whether

by

the

confusion

of

two

substances

,

or

by

the

disposition

of

one

?

We

,

however

,

affirm

that

the

mind

coalesces

with

the

soul

,

—

not

indeed

as

being

distinct

from

it

in

substance

,

but

as

being

its

natural

function

and

agent

.

Notes

1
Suggestum.
2
Comp. The Apology, c. xlviii.; August. De Civ. Dei, xiii. 17.
3
Comp. Adv. Valentin. vii. infra.
4
Addicit.
5
Alterum animi genus.
6
Concretum.
7
Substantiæ officium.