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A Treatise on the Soul

Tertullian

Chapter 18

About this work

Author: Tertullian

Chapter XVIII.—Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics. Functions of the Soul.

I turn now to the department of our intellectual faculties,

‹ Chapter 17 Chapter 19 ›

such

as

Plato

has

handed

it

over

to

the

heretics

,

distinct

from

our

bodily

functions

,

having

obtained

the

knowledge

of

them

before

death

.

He

asks

in

the

Phædo

,

What

,

then

,

(

do

you

think

)

concerning

the

actual

possession

of

knowledge

?

Will

the

body

be

a

hindrance

to

it

or

not

,

if

one

shall

admit

it

as

an

associate

in

the

search

after

knowledge

?

I

have

a

similar

question

to

ask

:

Have

the

faculties

of

their

sight

and

hearing

any

truth

and

reality

for

human

beings

or

not

?

Is

it

not

the

case

,

that

even

the

poets

are

always

muttering

against

us

,

that

we

can

never

hear

or

see

anything

for

certain

?

He

remembered

,

no

doubt

,

what

Epicharmus

the

comic

poet

had

said

:

“

It

is

the

mind

which

sees

,

the

mind

that

hears

—

all

else

is

blind

and

deaf

.

”

To

the

same

purport

he

says

again

,

that

man

is

the

wisest

whose

mental

power

is

the

clearest

;

who

never

applies

the

sense

of

sight

,

nor

adds

to

his

mind

the

help

of

any

such

faculty

,

but

employs

the

intellect

itself

in

unmixed

serenity

when

he

indulges

in

contemplation

for

the

purpose

of

acquiring

an

unalloyed

insight

into

the

nature

of

things

;

divorcing

himself

with

all

his

might

from

his

eyes

and

ears

and

(

as

one

must

express

himself

)

from

the

whole

of

his

body

,

on

the

ground

of

its

disturbing

the

soul

,

and

not

allowing

it

to

possess

either

truth

or

wisdom

,

whenever

it

is

brought

into

communication

with

it

.

We

see

,

then

,

that

in

opposition

to

the

bodily

senses

another

faculty

is

provided

of

a

much

more

serviceable

character

,

even

the

powers

of

the

soul

,

which

produce

an

understanding

of

that

truth

whose

realities

are

not

palpable

nor

open

to

the

bodily

senses

,

but

are

very

remote

from

men’s

everyday

knowledge

,

lying

in

secret

—

in

the

heights

above

,

and

in

the

presence

of

God

Himself

.

For

Plato

maintains

that

there

are

certain

invisible

substances

,

incorporeal

,

celestial

,

divine

,

and

eternal

,

which

they

call

ideas

,

that

is

to

say

,

(

archetypal

)

forms

,

which

are

the

patterns

and

causes

of

those

objects

of

nature

which

are

manifest

to

us

,

and

lie

under

our

corporeal

senses

:

the

former

,

(

according

to

Plato

,

)

are

the

actual

verities

,

and

the

latter

the

images

and

likenesses

of

them

.

Well

,

now

,

are

there

not

here

gleams

of

the

heretical

principles

of

the

Gnostics

and

the

Valentinians

?

It

is

from

this

philosophy

that

they

eagerly

adopt

the

difference

between

the

bodily

senses

and

the

intellectual

faculties

,

—

a

distinction

which

they

actually

apply

to

the

parable

of

the

ten

virgins

:

making

the

five

foolish

virgins

to

symbolize

the

five

bodily

senses

,

seeing

that

these

are

so

silly

and

so

easy

to

be

deceived

;

and

the

wise

virgin

to

express

the

meaning

of

the

intellectual

faculties

,

which

are

so

wise

as

to

attain

to

that

mysterious

and

supernal

truth

,

which

is

placed

in

the

pleroma

.

(

Here

,

then

,

we

have

)

the

mystic

original

of

the

ideas

of

these

heretics

.

For

in

this

philosophy

lie

both

their

Æons

and

their

genealogies

.

Thus

,

too

,

do

they

divide

sensation

,

both

into

the

intellectual

powers

from

their

spiritual

seed

,

and

the

sensuous

faculties

from

the

animal

,

which

cannot

by

any

means

comprehend

spiritual

things

.

From

the

former

germ

spring

invisible

things

;

from

the

latter

,

visible

things

which

are

grovelling

and

temporary

,

and

which

are

obvious

to

the

senses

,

placed

as

they

are

in

palpable

forms

.

It

is

because

of

these

views

that

we

have

in

a

former

passage

stated

as

a

preliminary

fact

,

that

the

mind

is

nothing

else

than

an

apparatus

or

instrument

of

the

soul

,

and

that

the

spirit

is

no

other

faculty

,

separate

from

the

soul

,

but

is

the

soul

itself

exercised

in

respiration

;

although

that

influence

which

either

God

on

the

one

hand

,

or

the

devil

on

the

other

,

has

breathed

upon

it

,

must

be

regarded

in

the

light

of

an

additional

element

.

And

now

,

with

respect

to

the

difference

between

the

intellectual

powers

and

the

sensuous

faculties

,

we

only

admit

it

so

far

as

the

natural

diversity

between

them

requires

of

us

.

(

There

is

,

of

course

,

a

difference

)

between

things

corporeal

and

things

spiritual

,

between

visible

and

invisible

beings

,

between

objects

which

are

manifest

to

the

view

and

those

which

are

hidden

from

it

;

because

the

one

class

are

attributed

to

sensation

,

and

the

other

to

the

intellect

.

But

yet

both

the

one

and

the

other

must

be

regarded

as

inherent

in

the

soul

,

and

as

obedient

to

it

,

seeing

that

it

embraces

bodily

objects

by

means

of

the

body

,

in

exactly

the

same

way

that

it

conceives

incorporeal

objects

by

help

of

the

mind

,

except

that

it

is

even

exercising

sensation

when

it

is

employing

the

intellect

.

For

is

it

not

true

,

that

to

employ

the

senses

is

to

use

the

intellect

?

And

to

employ

the

intellect

amounts

to

a

use

of

the

senses

?

What

indeed

can

sensation

be

,

but

the

understanding

of

that

which

is

the

object

of

the

sensation

?

And

what

can

the

intellect

or

understanding

be

,

but

the

seeing

of

that

which

is

the

object

understood

?

Why

adopt

such

excruciating

means

of

torturing

simple

knowledge

and

crucifying

the

truth

?

Who

can

show

me

the

sense

which

does

not

understand

the

object

of

its

sensation

,

or

the

intellect

which

perceives

not

the

object

which

it

understands

,

in

so

clear

a

way

as

to

prove

to

me

that

the

one

can

do

without

the

other

?

If

corporeal

things

are

the

objects

of

sense

,

and

incorporeal

ones

objects

of

the

intellect

,

it

is

the

classes

of

the

objects

which

are

different

,

not

the

domicile

or

abode

of

sense

and

intellect

;

in

other

words

,

not

the

soul

(

anima

)

and

the

mind

(

animus

)

.

By

what

,

in

short

,

are

corporeal

things

perceived

?

If

it

is

by

the

soul

,

then

the

mind

is

a

sensuous

faculty

,

and

not

merely

an

intellectual

power

;

for

whilst

it

understands

,

it

also

perceives

,

because

without

the

perception

there

is

no

understanding

.

If

,

however

,

corporeal

things

are

perceived

by

the

soul

,

then

it

follows

that

the

soul’s

power

is

an

intellectual

one

,

and

not

merely

a

sensuous

faculty

;

for

while

it

perceives

it

also

understands

,

because

without

understanding

there

is

no

perceiving

.

And

then

,

again

,

by

what

are

incorporeal

things

understood

?

If

it

is

by

the

mind

,

where

will

be

the

soul

?

If

it

is

by

the

soul

,

where

will

be

the

mind

?

For

things

which

differ

ought

to

be

mutually

absent

from

each

other

,

when

they

are

occupied

in

their

respective

functions

and

duties

.

It

must

be

your

opinion

,

indeed

,

that

the

mind

is

absent

from

the

soul

on

certain

occasions

;

for

(

you

suppose

)

that

we

are

so

made

and

constituted

as

not

to

know

that

we

have

seen

or

heard

something

,

on

the

hypothesis

that

the

mind

was

absent

at

the

time

.

I

must

therefore

maintain

that

the

very

soul

itself

neither

saw

nor

heard

,

since

it

was

at

the

given

moment

absent

with

its

active

power

—

that

is

to

say

,

the

mind

.

The

truth

is

,

that

whenever

a

man

is

out

of

his

mind

,

it

is

his

soul

that

is

demented

—

not

because

the

mind

is

absent

,

but

because

it

is

a

fellow

-

sufferer

(

with

the

soul

)

at

the

time

.

Indeed

,

it

is

the

soul

which

is

principally

affected

by

casualties

of

such

a

kind

.

Whence

is

this

fact

confirmed

?

It

is

confirmed

from

the

following

consideration

:

that

after

the

soul’s

departure

,

the

mind

is

no

longer

found

in

a

man

:

it

always

follows

the

soul

;

nor

does

it

at

last

remain

behind

it

alone

,

after

death

.

Now

,

since

it

follows

the

soul

,

it

is

also

indissolubly

attached

to

it

;

just

as

the

understanding

is

attached

to

the

soul

,

which

is

followed

by

the

mind

,

with

which

the

understanding

is

indissolubly

connected

.

Granted

now

that

the

understanding

is

superior

to

the

senses

,

and

a

better

discoverer

of

mysteries

,

what

matters

it

,

so

long

as

it

is

only

a

peculiar

faculty

of

the

soul

,

just

as

the

senses

themselves

are

?

It

does

not

at

all

affect

my

argument

,

unless

the

understanding

were

held

to

be

superior

to

the

senses

,

for

the

purpose

of

deducing

from

the

allegation

of

such

superiority

its

separate

condition

likewise

.

After

thus

combating

their

alleged

difference

,

I

have

also

to

refute

this

question

of

superiority

,

my

approaching

the

belief

(

which

heresy

propounds

)

in

a

superior

god

.

On

this

point

,

however

,

of

a

(

superior

)

god

,

we

shall

have

to

measure

swords

with

the

heretics

on

their

own

ground

.

Our

present

subject

concerns

the

soul

,

and

the

point

is

to

prevent

the

insidious

ascription

of

a

superiority

to

the

intellect

or

understanding

.

Now

,

although

the

objects

which

are

touched

by

the

intellect

are

of

a

higher

nature

,

since

they

are

spiritual

,

than

those

which

are

embraced

by

the

senses

,

since

these

are

corporeal

,

it

will

still

be

only

a

superiority

in

the

objects

—

as

of

lofty

ones

contrasted

with

humble

—

not

in

the

faculties

of

the

intellect

against

the

senses

.

For

how

can

the

intellect

be

superior

to

the

senses

,

when

it

is

these

which

educate

it

for

the

discovery

of

various

truths

?

It

is

a

fact

,

that

these

truths

are

learned

by

means

of

palpable

forms

;

in

other

words

,

invisible

things

are

discovered

by

the

help

of

visible

ones

,

even

as

the

apostle

tells

us

in

his

epistle

:

“

For

the

invisible

things

of

Him

are

clearly

seen

from

the

creation

of

the

world

,

being

understood

by

the

things

that

are

made

;

”

and

as

Plato

too

might

inform

our

heretics

:

“

The

things

which

appear

are

the

image

of

the

things

which

are

concealed

from

view

,

”

whence

it

must

needs

follow

that

this

world

is

by

all

means

an

image

of

some

other

:

so

that

the

intellect

evidently

uses

the

senses

for

its

own

guidance

,

and

authority

,

and

mainstay

;

and

without

the

senses

truth

could

not

be

attained

.

How

,

then

,

can

a

thing

be

superior

to

that

which

is

instrumental

to

its

existence

,

which

is

also

indispensable

to

it

,

and

to

whose

help

it

owes

everything

which

it

acquires

?

Two

conclusions

therefore

follow

from

what

we

have

said

:

(

1

)

That

the

intellect

is

not

to

be

preferred

above

the

senses

,

on

the

(

supposed

)

ground

that

the

agent

through

which

a

thing

exists

is

inferior

to

the

thing

itself

;

and

(

2

)

that

the

intellect

must

not

be

separated

from

the

senses

,

since

the

instrument

by

which

a

thing’s

existence

is

sustained

is

associated

with

the

thing

itself

.

Notes

1
Said ironically, as if rallying Plato for inconsistency between his theory here and the fact.
2
Supermundiales “placed above this world.”
3
Imaginibus.
4
See above, c. xii. p. 192.
5
Above, c. xi. p. 191.
6
Intelligere sentire est.
7
Oehler has “anima;” we should rather have expected “animo,” which is another reading.
8
“Animo” this time.
9
Subjunctive verb, “fuerit.”
10
Dementit.
11
The opposite opinion was held by Tertullian’s opponents, who distinguished between the mind and the soul. They said, that when a man was out of his mind, his mind left him, but that his soul remained. (Lactantius, De Opif. xviii.; Instit. Div. vii. 12; La Cerda).
12
See his treatise, Against Marcion.
13
Rom. i. 20.
14
Facies.
15
Timæus, pp. 29, 30, 37, 38.