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A Treatise on the Soul

Tertullian

Chapter 17

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Author: Tertullian

Chapter XVII.—The Fidelity of the Senses, Impugned by Plato, Vindicated by Christ Himself.

Then, again, when we encounter the question (as

‹ Chapter 16 Chapter 18 ›

to

the

veracity

of

those

five

senses

which

we

learn

with

our

alphabet

;

since

from

this

source

even

there

arises

some

support

for

our

heretics

.

They

are

the

faculties

of

seeing

,

and

hearing

,

and

smelling

,

and

tasting

,

and

touching

.

The

fidelity

of

these

senses

is

impugned

with

too

much

severity

by

the

Platonists

,

and

according

to

some

by

Heraclitus

also

,

and

Diocles

,

and

Empedocles

;

at

any

rate

,

Plato

,

in

the

Timæus

,

declares

the

operations

of

the

senses

to

be

irrational

,

and

vitiated

by

our

opinions

or

beliefs

.

Deception

is

imputed

to

the

sight

,

because

it

asserts

that

oars

,

when

immersed

in

the

water

,

are

inclined

or

bent

,

notwithstanding

the

certainty

that

they

are

straight

;

because

,

again

,

it

is

quite

sure

that

distant

tower

with

its

really

quadrangular

contour

is

round

;

because

also

it

will

discredit

the

fact

of

the

truly

parallel

fabric

of

yonder

porch

or

arcade

,

by

supposing

it

to

be

narrower

and

narrower

towards

its

end

;

and

because

it

will

join

with

the

sea

the

sky

which

hangs

at

so

great

a

height

above

it

.

In

the

same

way

,

our

hearing

is

charged

with

fallacy

:

we

think

,

for

instance

,

that

is

a

noise

in

the

sky

which

is

nothing

else

than

the

rumbling

of

a

carriage

;

or

,

if

you

prefer

it

the

other

way

,

when

the

thunder

rolled

at

a

distance

,

we

were

quite

sure

that

it

was

a

carriage

which

made

the

noise

.

Thus

,

too

,

are

our

faculties

of

smell

and

taste

at

fault

,

because

the

selfsame

perfumes

and

wines

lose

their

value

after

we

have

used

them

awhile

.

On

the

same

principle

our

touch

is

censured

,

when

the

identical

pavement

which

seemed

rough

to

the

hands

is

felt

by

the

feet

to

be

smooth

enough

;

and

in

the

baths

a

stream

of

warm

water

is

pronounced

to

be

quite

hot

at

first

,

and

beautifully

temperate

afterwards

.

Thus

,

according

to

them

,

our

senses

deceive

us

,

when

all

the

while

we

are

(

the

cause

of

the

discrepancies

,

by

)

changing

our

opinions

.

The

Stoics

are

more

moderate

in

their

views

;

for

they

do

not

load

with

the

obloquy

of

deception

every

one

of

the

senses

,

and

at

all

times

.

The

Epicureans

,

again

,

show

still

greater

consistency

,

in

maintaining

that

all

the

senses

are

equally

true

in

their

testimony

,

and

always

so

—

only

in

a

different

way

.

It

is

not

our

organs

of

sensation

that

are

at

fault

,

but

our

opinion

.

The

senses

only

experience

sensation

,

they

do

not

exercise

opinion

;

it

is

the

soul

that

opines

.

They

separated

opinion

from

the

senses

,

and

sensation

from

the

soul

.

Well

,

but

whence

comes

opinion

,

if

not

from

the

senses

?

Indeed

,

unless

the

eye

had

descried

a

round

shape

in

that

tower

,

it

could

have

had

no

idea

that

it

possessed

roundness

.

Again

,

whence

arises

sensation

if

not

from

the

soul

?

For

if

the

soul

had

no

body

,

it

would

have

no

sensation

.

Accordingly

,

sensation

comes

from

the

soul

,

and

opinion

from

sensation

;

and

the

whole

(

process

)

is

the

soul

.

But

further

,

it

may

well

be

insisted

on

that

there

is

a

something

which

causes

the

discrepancy

between

the

report

of

the

senses

and

the

reality

of

the

facts

.

Now

,

since

it

is

possible

,

(

as

we

have

seen

)

,

for

phenomena

to

be

reported

which

exist

not

in

the

objects

,

why

should

it

not

be

equally

possible

for

phenomena

to

be

reported

which

are

caused

not

by

the

senses

,

but

by

reasons

and

conditions

which

intervene

,

in

the

very

nature

of

the

case

?

If

so

,

it

will

be

only

right

that

they

should

be

duly

recognised

.

The

truth

is

,

that

it

was

the

water

which

was

the

cause

of

the

oar

seeming

to

be

inclined

or

bent

:

out

of

the

water

,

it

was

perfectly

straight

in

appearance

(

as

well

as

in

fact

)

.

The

delicacy

of

the

substance

or

medium

which

forms

a

mirror

by

means

of

its

luminosity

,

according

as

it

is

struck

or

shaken

,

by

the

vibration

actually

destroys

the

appearance

of

the

straightness

of

a

right

line

.

In

like

manner

,

the

condition

of

the

open

space

which

fills

up

the

interval

between

it

and

us

,

necessarily

causes

the

true

shape

of

the

tower

to

escape

our

notice

;

for

the

uniform

density

of

the

surrounding

air

covering

its

angles

with

a

similar

light

obliterates

their

outlines

.

So

,

again

,

the

equal

breadth

of

the

arcade

is

sharpened

or

narrowed

off

towards

its

termination

,

until

its

aspect

,

becoming

more

and

more

contracted

under

its

prolonged

roof

,

comes

to

a

vanishing

point

in

the

direction

of

its

farthest

distance

.

So

the

sky

blends

itself

with

the

sea

,

the

vision

becoming

spent

at

last

,

which

had

maintained

duly

the

boundaries

of

the

two

elements

,

so

long

as

its

vigorous

glance

lasted

.

As

for

the

(

alleged

cases

of

deceptive

)

hearing

,

what

else

could

produce

the

illusion

but

the

similarity

of

the

sounds

?

And

if

the

perfume

afterwards

was

less

strong

to

the

smell

,

and

the

wine

more

flat

to

the

taste

,

and

the

water

not

so

hot

to

the

touch

,

their

original

strength

was

after

all

found

in

the

whole

of

them

pretty

well

unimpaired

.

In

the

matter

,

however

,

of

the

roughness

and

smoothness

of

the

pavement

,

it

was

only

natural

and

right

that

limbs

like

the

hands

and

the

feet

,

so

different

in

tenderness

and

callousness

,

should

have

different

impressions

.

In

this

way

,

then

,

there

cannot

occur

an

illusion

in

our

senses

without

an

adequate

cause

.

Now

if

special

causes

,

(

such

as

we

have

indicated

,

)

mislead

our

senses

and

(

through

our

senses

)

our

opinions

also

,

then

we

must

no

longer

ascribe

the

deception

to

the

senses

,

which

follow

the

specific

causes

of

the

illusion

,

nor

to

the

opinions

we

form

;

for

these

are

occasioned

and

controlled

by

our

senses

,

which

only

follow

the

causes

.

Persons

who

are

afflicted

with

madness

or

insanity

,

mistake

one

object

for

another

.

Orestes

in

his

sister

sees

his

mother

;

Ajax

sees

Ulysses

in

the

slaughtered

herd

;

Athamas

and

Agave

descry

wild

beasts

in

their

children

.

Now

is

it

their

eyes

or

their

phrenzy

which

you

must

blame

for

so

vast

a

fallacy

?

All

things

taste

bitter

,

in

the

redundancy

of

their

bile

,

to

those

who

have

the

jaundice

.

Is

it

their

taste

which

you

will

charge

with

the

physical

prevarication

,

or

their

ill

state

of

health

?

All

the

senses

,

therefore

,

are

disordered

occasionally

,

or

imposed

upon

,

but

only

in

such

a

way

as

to

be

quite

free

of

any

fault

in

their

own

natural

functions

.

But

further

still

,

not

even

against

the

specific

causes

and

conditions

themselves

must

we

lay

an

indictment

of

deception

.

For

,

since

these

physical

aberrations

happen

for

stated

reasons

,

the

reasons

do

not

deserve

to

be

regarded

as

deceptions

.

Whatever

ought

to

occur

in

a

certain

manner

is

not

a

deception

.

If

,

then

,

even

these

circumstantial

causes

must

be

acquitted

of

all

censure

and

blame

,

how

much

more

should

we

free

from

reproach

the

senses

,

over

which

the

said

causes

exercise

a

liberal

sway

!

Hence

we

are

bound

most

certainly

to

claim

for

the

senses

truth

,

and

fidelity

,

and

integrity

,

seeing

that

they

never

render

any

other

account

of

their

impressions

than

is

enjoined

on

them

by

the

specific

causes

or

conditions

which

in

all

cases

produce

that

discrepancy

which

appears

between

the

report

of

the

senses

and

the

reality

of

the

objects

.

What

mean

you

,

then

,

O

most

insolent

Academy

?

You

overthrow

the

entire

condition

of

human

life

;

you

disturb

the

whole

order

of

nature

;

you

obscure

the

good

providence

of

God

Himself

:

for

the

senses

of

man

which

God

has

appointed

over

all

His

works

,

that

we

might

understand

,

inhabit

,

dispense

,

and

enjoy

them

,

(

you

reproach

)

as

fallacious

and

treacherous

tyrants

!

But

is

it

not

from

these

that

all

creation

receives

our

services

?

Is

it

not

by

their

means

that

a

second

form

is

impressed

even

upon

the

world

?

—

so

many

arts

,

so

many

industrious

resources

,

so

many

pursuits

,

such

business

,

such

offices

,

such

commerce

,

such

remedies

,

counsels

,

consolations

,

modes

,

civilizations

,

and

accomplishments

of

life

!

All

these

things

have

produced

the

very

relish

and

savour

of

human

existence

;

whilst

by

these

senses

of

man

,

he

alone

of

all

animated

nature

has

the

distinction

of

being

a

rational

animal

,

with

a

capacity

for

intelligence

and

knowledge

—

nay

,

an

ability

to

form

the

Academy

itself

!

But

Plato

,

in

order

to

disparage

the

testimony

of

the

senses

,

in

the

Phædrus

denies

(

in

the

person

of

Socrates

)

his

own

ability

to

know

even

himself

,

according

to

the

injunction

of

the

Delphic

oracle

;

and

in

the

Theætetus

he

deprives

himself

of

the

faculties

of

knowledge

and

sensation

;

and

again

,

in

the

Phædrus

he

postpones

till

after

death

the

posthumous

knowledge

,

as

he

calls

it

,

of

the

truth

;

and

yet

for

all

he

went

on

playing

the

philosopher

even

before

he

died

.

We

may

not

,

I

say

,

we

may

not

call

into

question

the

truth

of

the

(

poor

vilified

)

senses

,

lest

we

should

even

in

Christ

Himself

,

bring

doubt

upon

the

truth

of

their

sensation

;

lest

perchance

it

should

be

said

that

He

did

not

really

“

behold

Satan

as

lightning

fall

from

heaven

;

”

that

He

did

not

really

hear

the

Father’s

voice

testifying

of

Himself

;

or

that

He

was

deceived

in

touching

Peter’s

wife’s

mother

;

or

that

the

fragrance

of

the

ointment

which

He

afterwards

smelled

was

different

from

that

which

He

accepted

for

His

burial

;

and

that

the

taste

of

the

wine

was

different

from

that

which

He

consecrated

in

memory

of

His

blood

.

On

this

false

principle

it

was

that

Marcion

actually

chose

to

believe

that

He

was

a

phantom

,

denying

to

Him

the

reality

of

a

perfect

body

.

Now

,

not

even

to

His

apostles

was

His

nature

ever

a

matter

of

deception

.

He

was

truly

both

seen

and

heard

upon

the

mount

;

true

and

real

was

the

draught

of

that

wine

at

the

marriage

of

(

Cana

in

)

Galilee

;

true

and

real

also

was

the

touch

of

the

then

believing

Thomas

.

Read

the

testimony

of

John

:

“

That

which

we

have

seen

,

which

we

have

heard

,

which

we

have

looked

upon

with

our

eyes

,

and

our

hands

have

handled

,

of

the

Word

of

life

.

”

False

,

of

course

,

and

deceptive

must

have

been

that

testimony

,

if

the

witness

of

our

eyes

,

and

ears

,

and

hands

be

by

nature

a

lie

.

Notes

1
Academici.
2
Coimplicitam “entangled” or “embarrassed.” See the Timæus pp. 27, 28.
3
Vel.
4
Sensus istos.
5
Deliberetur.
6
Luke x. 18.
7
Matt. iii. 17.
8
Matt. viii. 15.
9
Matt. xxvi. 7–12.
10
Matt. xxvi. 27, 28; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 25.
11
Matt. xvii. 3–8.
12
John ii. 1–10.
13
John xx. 27.
14
1 John i. 1.