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A Treatise on the Soul

Tertullian

Chapter 24

About this work

Author: Tertullian

Chapter XXIV.—Plato’s Inconsistency. He Supposes the Soul Self-Existent, Yet Capable of Forgetting What Passed in a Previous State.

In the first place, I cannot allow that the soul

‹ Chapter 23 Chapter 25 ›

is

capable

of

a

failure

of

memory

;

because

he

has

conceded

to

it

so

large

an

amount

of

divine

quality

as

to

put

it

on

a

par

with

God

.

He

makes

it

unborn

,

which

single

attribute

I

might

apply

as

a

sufficient

attestation

of

its

perfect

divinity

;

he

then

adds

that

the

soul

is

immortal

,

incorruptible

,

incorporeal

—

since

he

believed

God

to

be

the

same

—

invisible

,

incapable

of

delineation

,

uniform

,

supreme

,

rational

,

and

intellectual

.

What

more

could

he

attribute

to

the

soul

,

if

he

wanted

to

call

it

God

?

We

,

however

,

who

allow

no

appendage

to

God

(

in

the

sense

of

equality

)

,

by

this

very

fact

reckon

the

soul

as

very

far

below

God

:

for

we

suppose

it

to

be

born

,

and

hereby

to

possess

something

of

a

diluted

divinity

and

an

attenuated

felicity

,

as

the

breath

(

of

God

)

,

though

not

His

spirit

;

and

although

immortal

,

as

this

is

an

attribute

of

divinity

,

yet

for

all

that

passible

,

since

this

is

an

incident

of

a

born

condition

,

and

consequently

from

the

first

capable

of

deviation

from

perfection

and

right

,

and

by

consequence

susceptible

of

a

failure

in

memory

.

This

point

I

have

discussed

sufficiently

with

Hermogenes

.

But

it

may

be

further

observed

,

that

if

the

soul

is

to

merit

being

accounted

a

god

,

by

reason

of

all

its

qualities

being

equal

to

the

attributes

of

God

,

it

must

then

be

subject

to

no

passion

,

and

therefore

to

no

loss

of

memory

;

for

this

defect

of

oblivion

is

as

great

an

injury

to

that

of

which

you

predicate

it

,

as

memory

is

the

glory

thereof

,

which

Plato

himself

deems

the

very

safeguard

of

the

senses

and

intellectual

faculties

,

and

which

Cicero

has

designated

the

treasury

of

all

the

sciences

.

Now

we

need

not

raise

the

doubt

whether

so

divine

a

faculty

as

the

soul

was

capable

of

losing

memory

:

the

question

rather

is

,

whether

it

is

able

to

recover

afresh

that

which

it

has

lost

.

I

could

not

decide

whether

that

,

which

ought

to

have

lost

memory

,

if

it

once

incurred

the

loss

,

would

be

powerful

enough

to

recollect

itself

.

Both

alternatives

,

indeed

,

will

agree

very

well

with

my

soul

,

but

not

with

Plato’s

.

In

the

second

place

,

my

objection

to

him

will

stand

thus

:

(

Plato

,

)

do

you

endow

the

soul

with

a

natural

competency

for

understanding

those

well

-

known

ideas

of

yours

?

Certainly

I

do

,

will

be

your

answer

.

Well

,

now

,

no

one

will

concede

to

you

that

the

knowledge

,

(

which

you

say

is

)

the

gift

of

nature

,

of

the

natural

sciences

can

fail

.

But

the

knowledge

of

the

sciences

fails

;

the

knowledge

of

the

various

fields

of

learning

and

of

the

arts

of

life

fails

;

and

so

perhaps

the

knowledge

of

the

faculties

and

affections

of

our

minds

fails

,

although

they

seem

to

be

inherent

in

our

nature

,

but

really

are

not

so

:

because

,

as

we

have

already

said

,

they

are

affected

by

accidents

of

place

,

of

manners

and

customs

,

of

bodily

condition

,

of

the

state

of

man’s

health

—

by

the

influences

of

the

Supreme

Powers

,

and

the

changes

of

man’s

free

-

will

.

Now

the

instinctive

knowledge

of

natural

objects

never

fails

,

not

even

in

the

brute

creation

.

The

lion

,

no

doubt

,

will

forget

his

ferocity

,

if

surrounded

by

the

softening

influence

of

training

;

he

may

become

,

with

his

beautiful

mane

,

the

plaything

of

some

Queen

Berenice

,

and

lick

her

cheeks

with

his

tongue

.

A

wild

beast

may

lay

aside

his

habits

,

but

his

natural

instincts

will

not

be

forgotten

.

He

will

not

forget

his

proper

food

,

nor

his

natural

resources

,

nor

his

natural

alarms

;

and

should

the

queen

offer

him

fishes

or

cakes

,

he

will

wish

for

flesh

;

and

if

,

when

he

is

ill

,

any

antidote

be

prepared

for

him

,

he

will

still

require

the

ape

;

and

should

no

hunting

-

spear

be

presented

against

him

,

he

will

yet

dread

the

crow

of

the

cock

.

In

like

manner

with

man

,

who

is

perhaps

the

most

forgetful

of

all

creatures

,

the

knowledge

of

everything

natural

to

him

will

remain

ineradicably

fixed

in

him

,

—

but

this

alone

,

as

being

alone

a

natural

instinct

.

He

will

never

forget

to

eat

when

he

is

hungry

;

or

to

drink

when

he

is

thirsty

;

or

to

use

his

eyes

when

he

wants

to

see

;

or

his

ears

,

to

hear

;

or

his

nose

,

to

smell

;

or

his

mouth

,

to

taste

;

or

his

hand

,

to

touch

.

These

are

,

to

be

sure

,

the

senses

,

which

philosophy

depreciates

by

her

preference

for

the

intellectual

faculties

.

But

if

the

natural

knowledge

of

the

sensuous

faculties

is

permanent

,

how

happens

it

that

the

knowledge

of

the

intellectual

faculties

fails

,

to

which

the

superiority

is

ascribed

?

Whence

,

now

,

arises

that

power

of

forgetfulness

itself

which

precedes

recollection

?

From

long

lapse

of

time

,

he

says

.

But

this

is

a

shortsighted

answer

.

Length

of

time

cannot

be

incidental

to

that

which

,

according

to

him

,

is

unborn

,

and

which

therefore

must

be

deemed

most

certainly

eternal

.

For

that

which

is

eternal

,

on

the

ground

of

its

being

unborn

,

since

it

admits

neither

of

beginning

nor

end

of

time

,

is

subject

to

no

temporal

criterion

.

And

that

which

time

does

not

measure

,

undergoes

no

change

in

consequence

of

time

;

nor

is

long

lapse

of

time

at

all

influential

over

it

.

If

time

is

a

cause

of

oblivion

,

why

,

from

the

time

of

the

soul’s

entrance

into

the

body

,

does

memory

fail

,

as

if

thenceforth

the

soul

were

to

be

affected

by

time

?

for

the

soul

,

being

undoubtedly

prior

to

the

body

,

was

of

course

not

irrespective

of

time

.

Is

it

,

indeed

,

immediately

on

the

soul’s

entrance

into

the

body

that

oblivion

takes

place

,

or

some

time

afterwards

?

If

immediately

,

where

will

be

the

long

lapse

of

the

time

which

is

as

yet

inadmissible

in

the

hypothesis

?

Take

,

for

instance

,

the

case

of

the

infant

.

If

some

time

afterwards

,

will

not

the

soul

,

during

the

interval

the

moment

of

oblivion

,

still

exercise

its

powers

of

memory

?

And

how

comes

it

to

pass

that

the

soul

subsequently

forgets

,

and

then

afterwards

again

remembers

?

How

long

,

too

,

must

the

lapse

of

the

time

be

regarded

as

having

been

,

during

which

the

oblivion

oppressed

the

soul

?

The

whole

course

of

one’s

life

,

I

apprehend

,

will

be

insufficient

to

efface

the

memory

of

an

age

which

endured

so

long

before

the

soul’s

assumption

of

the

body

.

But

then

,

again

,

Plato

throws

the

blame

upon

the

body

,

as

if

it

were

at

all

credible

that

a

born

substance

could

extinguish

the

power

of

one

that

is

unborn

.

There

exist

,

however

,

among

bodies

a

great

many

differences

,

by

reason

of

their

rationality

,

their

bulk

,

their

condition

,

their

age

,

and

their

health

.

Will

there

then

be

supposed

to

exist

similar

differences

in

obliviousness

?

Oblivion

,

however

,

is

uniform

and

identical

.

Therefore

bodily

peculiarity

,

with

its

manifold

varieties

,

will

not

become

the

cause

of

an

effect

which

is

an

invariable

one

.

There

are

likewise

,

according

to

Plato’s

own

testimony

,

many

proofs

to

show

that

the

soul

has

a

divining

faculty

,

as

we

have

already

advanced

against

Hermogenes

.

But

there

is

not

a

man

living

,

who

does

not

himself

feel

his

soul

possessed

with

a

presage

and

augury

of

some

omen

,

danger

,

or

joy

.

Now

,

if

the

body

is

not

prejudicial

to

divination

,

it

will

not

,

I

suppose

,

be

injurious

to

memory

.

One

thing

is

certain

,

that

souls

in

the

same

body

both

forget

and

remember

.

If

any

corporeal

condition

engenders

forgetfulness

,

how

will

it

admit

the

opposite

state

of

recollection

?

Because

recollection

,

after

forgetfulness

,

is

actually

the

resurrection

of

the

memory

.

Now

,

how

should

not

that

which

is

hostile

to

the

memory

at

first

,

be

also

prejudicial

to

it

in

the

second

instance

?

Lastly

,

who

have

better

memories

than

little

children

,

with

their

fresh

,

unworn

souls

,

not

yet

immersed

in

domestic

and

public

cares

,

but

devoted

only

to

those

studies

the

acquirement

of

which

is

itself

a

reminiscence

?

Why

,

indeed

,

do

we

not

all

of

us

recollect

in

an

equal

degree

,

since

we

are

equal

in

our

forgetfulness

?

But

this

is

true

only

of

philosophers

!

But

not

even

of

the

whole

of

them

.

Amongst

so

many

nations

,

in

so

great

a

crowd

of

sages

,

Plato

,

to

be

sure

,

is

the

only

man

who

has

combined

the

oblivion

and

the

recollection

of

ideas

.

Now

,

since

this

main

argument

of

his

by

no

means

keeps

its

ground

,

it

follows

that

its

entire

superstructure

must

fall

with

it

,

namely

,

that

souls

are

supposed

to

be

unborn

,

and

to

live

in

the

heavenly

regions

,

and

to

be

instructed

in

the

divine

mysteries

thereof

;

moreover

,

that

they

descend

to

this

earth

,

and

here

recall

to

memory

their

,

for

the

purpose

,

of

course

,

of

supplying

to

our

heretics

the

fitting

materials

for

their

systems

.

Notes

1
Nihil Deo appendimus.
2
Exorbitationis.
3
In his, now lost, treatise, De Censu Animæ.
4
Above, in ch. xix. xx. pp. 200, 201.
5
Or, “which has been too short for calculation.”