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A Treatise on the Soul

Tertullian

Chapter 32

About this work

Author: Tertullian

Chapter XXXII.—Empedocles Increased the Absurdity of Pythagoras by Developing the Posthumous Change of Men into Various Animals.

But the fact is, Empedocles, who used to dream

‹ Chapter 31 Chapter 33 ›

that

he

was

a

god

,

and

on

that

account

,

I

suppose

,

disdained

to

have

it

thought

that

he

had

ever

before

been

merely

some

hero

,

declares

in

so

many

words

:

“

I

once

was

Thamnus

,

and

a

fish

.

”

Why

not

rather

a

melon

,

seeing

that

he

was

such

a

fool

;

or

a

cameleon

,

for

his

inflated

brag

?

It

was

,

no

doubt

,

as

a

fish

(

and

a

queer

one

too

!

)

that

he

escaped

the

corruption

of

some

obscure

grave

,

when

he

preferred

being

roasted

by

a

plunge

into

Ætna

;

after

which

accomplishment

there

was

an

end

for

ever

to

his

μετενσωμάτωσις

or

putting

himself

into

another

body

—

(

fit

only

now

for

)

a

light

dish

after

the

roast

-

meat

.

At

this

point

,

therefore

,

we

must

likewise

contend

against

that

still

more

monstrous

presumption

,

that

in

the

course

of

the

transmigration

beasts

pass

from

human

beings

,

and

human

beings

from

beasts

.

Let

(

Empedocles

’

)

Thamnuses

alone

.

Our

slight

notice

of

them

in

passing

will

be

quite

enough

:

(

to

dwell

on

them

longer

will

inconvenience

us

,

)

lest

we

should

be

obliged

to

have

recourse

to

raillery

and

laughter

instead

of

serious

instruction

.

Now

our

position

is

this

:

that

the

human

soul

cannot

by

any

means

at

all

be

transferred

to

beasts

,

even

when

they

are

supposed

to

originate

,

according

to

the

philosophers

,

out

of

the

substances

of

the

elements

.

Now

let

us

suppose

that

the

soul

is

either

fire

,

or

water

,

or

blood

,

or

spirit

,

or

air

,

or

light

;

we

must

not

forget

that

all

the

animals

in

their

several

kinds

have

properties

which

are

opposed

to

the

respective

elements

.

There

are

the

cold

animals

which

are

opposed

to

fire

—

water

-

snakes

,

lizards

,

salamanders

,

and

what

things

soever

are

produced

out

of

the

rival

element

of

water

.

In

like

manner

,

those

creatures

are

opposite

to

water

which

are

in

their

nature

dry

and

sapless

;

indeed

,

locusts

,

butterflies

,

and

chameleons

rejoice

in

droughts

.

So

,

again

,

such

creatures

are

opposed

to

blood

which

have

none

of

its

purple

hue

,

such

as

snails

,

worms

,

and

most

of

the

fishy

tribes

.

Then

opposed

to

spirit

are

those

creatures

which

seem

to

have

no

respiration

,

being

unfurnished

with

lungs

and

windpipes

,

such

as

gnats

,

ants

,

moths

,

and

minute

things

of

this

sort

.

Opposed

,

moreover

,

to

air

are

those

creatures

which

always

live

under

ground

and

under

water

,

and

never

imbibe

air

—

things

of

which

you

are

more

acquainted

with

the

existence

than

with

the

names

.

Then

opposed

to

light

are

those

things

which

are

either

wholly

blind

,

or

possess

eyes

for

the

darkness

only

,

such

as

moles

,

bats

,

and

owls

.

These

examples

(

have

I

adduced

)

,

that

I

might

illustrate

my

subject

from

clear

and

palpable

natures

.

But

even

if

I

could

take

in

my

hand

the

“

atoms

”

of

Epicurus

,

or

if

my

eye

could

see

the

“

numbers

”

of

Pythagoras

,

or

if

my

foot

could

stumble

against

the

“

ideas

”

of

Plato

,

or

if

I

could

lay

hold

of

the

“

entelechies

”

of

Aristotle

,

the

chances

would

be

,

that

even

in

these

(

impalpable

)

classes

I

should

find

such

animals

as

I

must

oppose

to

one

another

on

the

ground

of

their

contrariety

.

For

I

maintain

that

,

of

whichsoever

of

the

before

-

mentioned

natures

the

human

soul

is

composed

,

it

would

not

have

been

possible

for

it

to

pass

for

new

forms

into

animals

so

contrary

to

each

of

the

separate

natures

,

and

to

bestow

an

origin

by

its

passage

on

those

beings

,

from

which

it

would

have

to

be

excluded

and

rejected

rather

than

to

be

admitted

and

received

,

by

reason

of

that

original

contrariety

which

we

have

supposed

it

to

possess

,

and

which

commits

the

bodily

substance

receiving

it

to

an

interminable

strife

;

and

then

again

by

reason

of

the

subsequent

contrariety

,

which

results

from

the

development

inseparable

from

each

several

nature

.

Now

it

is

on

quite

different

conditions

that

the

soul

of

man

has

had

assigned

to

it

(

in

individual

bodies

)

its

abode

,

and

aliment

,

and

order

,

and

sensation

,

and

affection

,

and

sexual

intercourse

,

and

procreation

of

children

;

also

(

on

different

conditions

has

it

,

in

individual

bodies

,

received

especial

)

dispositions

,

as

well

as

duties

to

fulfil

,

likings

,

dislikes

,

vices

,

desires

,

pleasures

,

maladies

,

remedies

—

in

short

,

its

own

modes

of

living

,

its

own

outlets

of

death

.

How

,

then

,

shall

that

(

human

)

soul

which

cleaves

to

the

earth

,

and

is

unable

without

alarm

to

survey

any

great

height

,

or

any

considerable

depth

,

and

which

is

also

fatigued

if

it

mounts

many

steps

,

and

is

suffocated

if

it

is

submerged

in

a

fish

-

pond

,

—

(

how

,

I

say

,

shall

a

soul

which

is

beset

with

such

weaknesses

)

mount

up

at

some

future

stage

into

the

air

in

an

eagle

,

or

plunge

into

the

sea

in

an

eel

?

How

,

again

,

shall

it

,

after

being

nourished

with

generous

and

delicate

as

well

as

exquisite

viands

,

feed

deliberately

on

,

I

will

not

say

husks

,

but

even

on

thorns

,

and

the

wild

fare

of

bitter

leaves

,

and

beasts

of

the

dung

-

hill

,

and

poisonous

worms

,

if

it

has

to

migrate

into

a

goat

or

into

a

quail

?

—

nay

,

it

may

be

,

feed

on

carrion

,

even

on

human

corpses

in

some

bear

or

lion

?

But

how

indeed

(

shall

it

stoop

to

this

)

,

when

it

remembers

its

own

(

nature

and

dignity

)

?

In

the

same

way

,

you

may

submit

all

other

instances

to

this

criterion

of

incongruity

,

and

so

save

us

from

lingering

over

the

distinct

consideration

of

each

of

them

in

turn

.

Now

,

whatever

may

be

the

measure

and

whatever

the

mode

of

the

human

soul

,

(

the

question

is

forced

upon

us

,

)

what

it

will

do

in

far

larger

animals

,

or

in

very

diminutive

ones

?

It

must

needs

be

,

that

every

individual

body

of

whatever

size

is

filled

up

by

the

soul

,

and

that

the

soul

is

entirely

covered

by

the

body

.

How

,

therefore

,

shall

a

man’s

soul

fill

an

elephant

?

How

,

likewise

,

shall

it

be

contracted

within

a

gnat

?

If

it

be

so

enormously

extended

or

contracted

,

it

will

no

doubt

be

exposed

to

peril

.

And

this

induces

me

to

ask

another

question

:

If

the

soul

is

by

no

means

capable

of

this

kind

of

migration

into

animals

,

which

are

not

fitted

for

its

reception

,

either

by

the

habits

of

their

bodies

or

the

other

laws

of

their

being

,

will

it

then

undergo

a

change

according

to

the

properties

of

various

animals

,

and

be

adapted

to

their

life

,

notwithstanding

its

contrariety

to

human

life

—

having

,

in

fact

,

become

contrary

to

its

human

self

by

reason

of

its

utter

change

?

Now

the

truth

is

,

if

it

undergoes

such

a

transformation

,

and

loses

what

it

once

was

,

the

human

soul

will

not

be

what

it

was

;

and

if

it

ceases

to

be

its

former

self

,

the

metensomatosis

,

or

adaptation

of

some

other

body

,

comes

to

nought

,

and

is

not

of

course

to

be

ascribed

to

the

soul

which

will

cease

to

exist

,

on

the

supposition

of

its

complete

change

.

For

only

then

can

a

soul

be

said

to

experience

this

process

of

the

metensomatosis

,

when

it

undergoes

it

by

remaining

unchanged

in

its

own

(

primitive

)

condition

.

Since

,

therefore

,

the

soul

does

not

admit

of

change

,

lest

it

should

cease

to

retain

its

identity

;

and

yet

is

unable

to

remain

unchanged

in

its

original

state

,

because

it

fails

then

to

receive

contrary

(

bodies

)

,

—

I

still

want

to

know

some

credible

reason

to

justify

such

a

transformation

as

we

are

discussing

.

For

although

some

men

are

compared

to

the

beasts

because

of

their

character

,

disposition

,

and

pursuits

(

since

even

God

says

,

“

Man

is

like

the

beasts

that

perish

”

)

,

it

does

not

on

this

account

follow

that

rapacious

persons

become

kites

,

lewd

persons

dogs

,

ill

-

tempered

ones

panthers

,

good

men

sheep

,

talkative

ones

swallows

,

and

chaste

men

doves

,

as

if

the

selfsame

substance

of

the

soul

everywhere

repeated

its

own

nature

in

the

properties

of

the

animals

(

into

which

it

passed

)

.

Besides

,

a

substance

is

one

thing

,

and

the

nature

of

that

substance

is

another

thing

;

inasmuch

as

the

substance

is

the

special

property

of

one

given

thing

,

whereas

the

nature

thereof

may

possibly

belong

to

many

things

.

Take

an

example

or

two

.

A

stone

or

a

piece

of

iron

is

the

substance

:

the

hardness

of

the

stone

and

the

iron

is

the

nature

of

the

substance

.

Their

hardness

combines

objects

by

a

common

quality

;

their

substances

keep

them

separate

.

Then

,

again

,

there

is

softness

in

wool

,

and

softness

in

a

feather

:

their

natural

qualities

are

alike

,

(

and

put

them

on

a

par

;

)

their

substantial

qualities

are

not

alike

,

(

and

keep

them

distinct

.

)

Thus

,

if

a

man

likewise

be

designated

a

wild

beast

or

a

harmless

one

,

there

is

not

for

all

that

an

identity

of

soul

.

Now

the

similarity

of

nature

is

even

then

observed

,

when

dissimilarity

of

substance

is

most

conspicuous

:

for

,

by

the

very

fact

of

your

judging

that

a

man

resembles

a

beast

,

you

confess

that

their

soul

is

not

identical

;

for

you

say

that

they

resemble

each

other

,

not

that

they

are

the

same

.

This

is

also

the

meaning

of

the

word

of

God

(

which

we

have

just

quoted

)

:

it

likens

man

to

the

beasts

in

nature

,

but

not

in

substance

.

Besides

,

God

would

not

have

actually

made

such

a

comment

as

this

concerning

man

,

if

He

had

known

him

to

be

in

substance

only

bestial

.

Notes

1
Hujus.
2
Alias.
3
This is the force of the objective nouns, which are all put in the plural form.
4
Ps. xlix. 20.