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A Treatise on the Soul

Tertullian

Chapter 6

About this work

Author: Tertullian

Chapter VI.—The Arguments of the Platonists for the Soul’s Incorporeality, Opposed, Perhaps Frivolously.

These conclusions the Platonists disturb more by subtilty than by truth

‹ Chapter 5 Chapter 7 ›

.

Every

body

,

they

say

,

has

necessarily

either

an

animate

nature

or

an

inanimate

one

.

If

it

has

the

inanimate

nature

,

it

receives

motion

externally

to

itself

;

if

the

animate

one

,

internally

.

Now

the

soul

receives

motion

neither

externally

nor

internally

:

not

externally

,

since

it

has

not

the

inanimate

nature

;

nor

internally

,

because

it

is

itself

rather

the

giver

of

motion

to

the

body

.

It

evidently

,

then

,

is

not

a

bodily

substance

,

inasmuch

as

it

receives

motion

neither

way

,

according

to

the

nature

and

law

of

corporeal

substances

.

Now

,

what

first

surprises

us

here

,

is

the

unsuitableness

of

a

definition

which

appeals

to

objects

which

have

no

affinity

with

the

soul

.

For

it

is

impossible

for

the

soul

to

be

called

either

an

animate

body

or

an

inanimate

one

,

inasmuch

as

it

is

the

soul

itself

which

makes

the

body

either

animate

,

if

it

be

present

to

it

,

or

else

inanimate

,

if

it

be

absent

from

it

.

That

,

therefore

,

which

produces

a

result

,

cannot

itself

be

the

result

,

so

as

to

be

entitled

to

the

designation

of

an

animate

thing

or

an

inanimate

one

.

The

soul

is

so

called

in

respect

of

its

own

substance

.

If

,

then

,

that

which

is

the

soul

admits

not

of

being

called

an

animate

body

or

an

inanimate

one

,

how

can

it

challenge

comparison

with

the

nature

and

law

of

animate

and

inanimate

bodies

?

Furthermore

,

since

it

is

characteristic

of

a

body

to

be

moved

externally

by

something

else

,

and

as

we

have

already

shown

that

the

soul

receives

motion

from

some

other

thing

when

it

is

swayed

(

from

the

outside

,

of

course

,

by

something

else

)

by

prophetic

influence

or

by

madness

,

therefore

I

must

be

right

in

regarding

that

as

bodily

substance

which

,

according

to

the

examples

we

have

quoted

,

is

moved

by

some

other

object

from

without

.

Now

,

if

to

receive

motion

from

some

other

thing

is

characteristic

of

a

body

,

how

much

more

is

it

so

to

impart

motion

to

something

else

!

But

the

soul

moves

the

body

,

all

whose

efforts

are

apparent

externally

,

and

from

without

.

It

is

the

soul

which

gives

motion

to

the

feet

for

walking

,

and

to

the

hands

for

touching

,

and

to

the

eyes

for

sight

,

and

to

the

tongue

for

speech

—

a

sort

of

internal

image

which

moves

and

animates

the

surface

.

Whence

could

accrue

such

power

to

the

soul

,

if

it

were

incorporeal

?

How

could

an

unsubstantial

thing

propel

solid

objects

?

But

in

what

way

do

the

senses

in

man

seem

to

be

divisible

into

the

corporeal

and

the

intellectual

classes

?

They

tell

us

that

the

qualities

of

things

corporeal

,

such

as

earth

and

fire

,

are

indicated

by

the

bodily

senses

—

of

touch

and

sight

;

whilst

(

the

qualities

)

of

incorporeal

things

—

for

instance

,

benevolence

and

malignity

—

are

discovered

by

the

intellectual

faculties

.

And

from

this

(

they

deduce

what

is

to

them

)

the

manifest

conclusion

,

that

the

soul

is

incorporeal

,

its

properties

being

comprehended

by

the

perception

not

of

bodily

organs

,

but

of

intellectual

faculties

.

Well

,

(

I

shall

be

much

surprised

)

if

I

do

not

at

once

cut

away

the

very

ground

on

which

their

argument

stands

.

For

I

show

them

how

incorporeal

things

are

commonly

submitted

to

the

bodily

senses

—

sound

,

for

instance

,

to

the

organ

of

hearing

;

colour

,

to

the

organ

of

sight

;

smell

,

to

the

olfactory

organ

.

And

,

just

as

in

these

instances

,

the

soul

likewise

has

its

contact

with

the

body

;

not

to

say

that

the

incorporeal

objects

are

reported

to

us

through

the

bodily

organs

,

for

the

express

reason

that

they

come

into

contact

with

the

said

organs

.

Inasmuch

,

then

,

as

it

is

evident

that

even

incorporeal

objects

are

embraced

and

comprehended

by

corporeal

ones

,

why

should

not

the

soul

,

which

is

corporeal

,

be

equally

comprehended

and

understood

by

incorporeal

faculties

?

It

is

thus

certain

that

their

argument

fails

.

Among

their

more

conspicuous

arguments

will

be

found

this

,

that

in

their

judgment

every

bodily

substance

is

nourished

by

bodily

substances

;

whereas

the

soul

,

as

being

an

incorporeal

essence

,

is

nourished

by

incorporeal

aliments

—

for

instance

,

by

the

studies

of

wisdom

.

But

even

this

ground

has

no

stability

in

it

,

since

Soranus

,

who

is

a

most

accomplished

authority

in

medical

science

,

affords

us

as

answer

,

when

he

asserts

that

the

soul

is

even

nourished

by

corporeal

aliments

;

that

in

fact

it

is

,

when

failing

and

weak

,

actually

refreshed

oftentimes

by

food

.

Indeed

,

when

deprived

of

all

food

,

does

not

the

soul

entirely

remove

from

the

body

?

Soranus

,

then

,

after

discoursing

about

the

soul

in

the

amplest

manner

,

filling

four

volumes

with

his

dissertations

,

and

after

weighing

well

all

the

opinions

of

the

philosophers

,

defends

the

corporeality

of

the

soul

,

although

in

the

process

he

has

robbed

it

of

its

immortality

.

For

to

all

men

it

is

not

given

to

believe

the

truth

which

Christians

are

privileged

to

hold

.

As

,

therefore

,

Soranus

has

shown

us

from

facts

that

the

soul

is

nourished

by

corporeal

aliments

,

let

the

philosopher

(

adopt

a

similar

mode

of

proof

,

and

)

show

that

it

is

sustained

by

an

incorporeal

food

.

But

the

fact

is

,

that

no

one

has

even

been

able

to

quench

this

man’s

doubts

and

difficulties

about

the

condition

of

the

soul

with

the

honey

-

water

of

Plato’s

subtle

eloquence

,

nor

to

surfeit

them

with

the

crumbs

from

the

minute

nostrums

of

Aristotle

.

But

what

is

to

become

of

the

souls

of

all

those

robust

barbarians

,

which

have

had

no

nurture

of

philosopher’s

lore

indeed

,

and

yet

are

strong

in

untaught

practical

wisdom

,

and

which

although

very

starvelings

in

philosophy

,

without

your

Athenian

academies

and

porches

,

and

even

the

prison

of

Socrates

,

do

yet

contrive

to

live

?

For

it

is

not

the

soul’s

actual

substance

which

is

benefited

by

the

aliment

of

learned

study

,

but

only

its

conduct

and

discipline

;

such

ailment

contributing

nothing

to

increase

its

bulk

,

but

only

to

enhance

its

grace

.

It

is

,

moreover

,

a

happy

circumstance

that

the

Stoics

affirm

that

even

the

arts

have

corporeality

;

since

at

the

rate

the

soul

too

must

be

corporeal

,

since

it

is

commonly

supposed

to

be

nourished

by

the

arts

.

Such

,

however

,

is

the

enormous

preoccupation

of

the

philosophic

mind

,

that

it

is

generally

unable

to

see

straight

before

it

.

Hence

(

the

story

of

)

Thales

falling

into

the

well

.

It

very

commonly

,

too

,

through

not

understanding

even

its

own

opinions

,

suspects

a

failure

of

its

own

health

.

Hence

(

the

story

of

)

Chrysippus

and

the

hellebore

.

Some

such

hallucination

,

I

take

it

,

must

have

occurred

to

him

,

when

he

asserted

that

two

bodies

could

not

possibly

be

contained

in

one

:

he

must

have

kept

out

of

mind

and

sight

the

case

of

those

pregnant

women

who

,

day

after

day

,

bear

not

one

body

,

but

even

two

and

three

at

a

time

,

within

the

embrace

of

a

single

womb

.

One

finds

likewise

,

in

the

records

of

the

civil

law

,

the

instance

of

a

certain

Greek

woman

who

gave

birth

to

a

quint

of

children

,

the

mother

of

all

these

at

one

parturition

,

the

manifold

parent

of

a

single

brood

,

the

prolific

produce

from

a

single

womb

,

who

,

guarded

by

so

many

bodies

—

I

had

almost

said

,

a

people

—

was

herself

no

less

then

the

sixth

person

!

The

whole

creation

testifies

how

that

those

bodies

which

are

naturally

destined

to

issue

from

bodies

,

are

already

(

included

)

in

that

from

which

they

proceed

.

Now

that

which

proceeds

from

some

other

thing

must

needs

be

second

to

it

.

Nothing

,

however

,

proceeds

out

of

another

thing

except

by

the

process

of

generation

;

but

then

they

are

two

(

things

)

.

Notes

1
Animale, “having the nature of soul.”
2
Inanimale.
3
Accedit.
4
We follow Oehler’s view of this obscure passage, in preference to Rigaltius’.
5
See Tertullian’s Ad Nationes (our translation), p. 33, Supra..
6
Quinionem.