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Tertullian

Book 2 · Chapter 3

About this work

Author: Tertullian

Chapter III.—The Physical Philosophers Maintained the Divinity of the Elements; The Absurdity of the Tenet Exposed.

From these developments of opinion, we see that your physical class

‹ Book 2 · Chapter 2 Book 2 · Chapter 5 ›

of

philosophers

are

driven

to

the

necessity

of

contending

that

the

elements

are

gods

,

since

it

alleges

that

other

gods

are

sprung

from

them

;

for

it

is

only

from

gods

that

gods

could

be

born

.

Now

,

although

we

shall

have

to

examine

these

other

gods

more

fully

in

the

proper

place

,

in

the

mythic

section

of

the

poets

,

yet

,

inasmuch

as

we

must

meanwhile

treat

of

them

in

their

connection

with

the

present

class

,

we

shall

probably

even

from

their

present

class

,

when

once

we

turn

to

the

gods

themselves

,

succeed

in

showing

that

they

can

by

no

means

appear

to

be

gods

who

are

said

to

be

sprung

from

the

elements

;

so

that

we

have

at

once

a

presumption

that

the

elements

are

not

gods

,

since

they

which

are

born

of

the

elements

are

not

gods

.

In

like

manner

,

whilst

we

show

that

the

elements

are

not

gods

,

we

shall

,

according

to

the

law

of

natural

relationship

,

get

a

presumptive

argument

that

they

cannot

rightly

be

maintained

to

be

gods

whose

parents

(

in

this

case

the

elements

)

are

not

gods

.

It

is

a

settled

point

that

a

god

is

born

of

a

god

,

and

that

what

lacks

divinity

is

born

of

what

is

not

divine

.

Now

,

so

far

as

the

world

of

which

your

philosophers

treat

(

for

I

apply

this

term

to

the

universe

in

the

most

comprehensive

sense

)

contains

the

elements

,

ministering

to

them

as

its

component

parts

(

for

whatever

its

own

condition

may

be

,

the

same

of

course

will

be

that

of

its

elements

and

constituent

portions

)

,

it

must

needs

have

been

formed

either

by

some

being

,

according

to

the

enlightened

view

of

Plato

,

or

else

by

none

,

according

to

the

harsh

opinion

of

Epicurus

;

and

since

it

was

formed

,

by

having

a

beginning

,

it

must

also

have

an

end

.

That

,

therefore

,

which

at

one

time

before

its

beginning

had

no

existence

,

and

will

by

and

by

after

its

end

cease

to

have

an

existence

,

cannot

of

course

,

by

any

possibility

,

seem

to

be

a

god

,

wanting

as

it

does

that

essential

character

of

divinity

,

eternity

,

which

is

reckoned

to

be

without

beginning

,

and

without

end

.

If

,

however

,

it

is

in

no

wise

formed

,

and

therefore

ought

to

be

accounted

divine

—

since

,

as

divine

,

it

is

subject

neither

to

a

beginning

nor

an

end

of

itself

—

how

is

it

that

some

assign

generation

to

the

elements

,

which

they

hold

to

be

gods

,

when

the

Stoics

deny

that

anything

can

be

born

of

a

god

?

Likewise

,

how

is

it

that

they

wish

those

beings

,

whom

they

suppose

to

be

born

of

the

elements

,

to

be

regarded

as

gods

,

when

they

deny

that

a

god

can

be

born

?

Now

,

what

must

hold

good

of

the

universe

will

have

to

be

predicated

of

the

elements

,

I

mean

of

heaven

,

and

of

earth

,

and

of

the

stars

,

and

of

fire

,

which

Varro

has

vainly

proposed

that

you

should

believe

to

be

gods

,

and

the

parents

of

gods

,

contrary

to

that

generation

and

nativity

which

he

had

declared

to

be

impossible

in

a

god

.

Now

this

same

Varro

had

shown

that

the

earth

and

the

stars

were

animated

.

But

if

this

be

the

case

,

they

must

needs

be

also

mortal

,

according

to

the

condition

of

animated

nature

;

for

although

the

soul

is

evidently

immortal

,

this

attribute

is

limited

to

it

alone

:

it

is

not

extended

to

that

with

which

it

is

associated

,

that

is

,

the

body

.

Nobody

,

however

,

will

deny

that

the

elements

have

body

,

since

we

both

touch

them

and

are

touched

by

them

,

and

we

see

certain

bodies

fall

down

from

them

.

If

,

therefore

,

they

are

animated

,

laying

aside

the

principle

of

a

soul

,

as

befits

their

condition

as

bodies

,

they

are

mortal

—

of

course

not

immortal

.

And

yet

whence

is

it

that

the

elements

appear

to

Varro

to

be

animated

?

Because

,

forsooth

,

the

elements

have

motion

.

And

then

,

in

order

to

anticipate

what

may

be

objected

on

the

other

side

,

that

many

things

else

have

motion

—

as

wheels

,

as

carriages

,

as

several

other

machines

—

he

volunteers

the

statement

that

he

believes

only

such

things

to

be

animated

as

move

of

themselves

,

without

any

apparent

mover

or

impeller

from

without

,

like

the

apparent

mover

of

the

wheel

,

or

propeller

of

the

carriage

,

or

director

of

the

machine

.

If

,

then

,

they

are

not

animated

,

they

have

no

motion

of

themselves

.

Now

,

when

he

thus

alleges

a

power

which

is

not

apparent

,

he

points

to

what

it

was

his

duty

to

seek

after

,

even

the

creator

and

controller

of

the

motion

;

for

it

does

not

at

once

follow

that

,

because

we

do

not

see

a

thing

,

we

believe

that

it

does

not

exist

.

Rather

,

it

is

necessary

the

more

profoundly

to

investigate

what

one

does

not

see

,

in

order

the

better

to

understand

the

character

of

that

which

is

apparent

.

Besides

if

(

you

admit

)

only

the

existence

of

those

things

which

appear

and

are

supposed

to

exist

simply

because

they

appear

,

how

is

it

that

you

also

admit

them

to

be

gods

which

do

not

appear

?

If

,

moreover

,

those

things

seem

to

have

existence

which

have

none

,

why

may

they

not

have

existence

also

which

do

not

seem

to

have

it

?

Such

,

for

instance

,

as

the

Mover

of

the

heavenly

beings

.

Granted

,

then

,

that

things

are

animated

because

they

move

of

themselves

,

and

that

they

move

of

themselves

when

they

are

not

moved

by

another

:

still

it

does

not

follow

that

they

must

straightway

be

gods

,

because

they

are

animated

,

nor

even

because

they

move

of

themselves

;

else

what

is

to

prevent

all

animals

whatever

being

accounted

gods

,

moving

as

they

do

of

themselves

?

This

,

to

be

sure

,

is

allowed

to

the

Egyptians

,

but

their

superstitious

vanity

has

another

basis

.

Notes

1
Istud.
2
Ad præsentem speciem, the physical class.
3
Or, classification.
4
Ut jam hinc præjudicatum sit.
5
Ad illam agnatorum speciem.
6
Scitum.
7
Non-deum.
8
“Quod,” with a subj. mood.
9
Mundus iste.
10
Summaliter.
11
Humanitas.
12
Duritia.
13
Censetur.
14
i.e., “iste mundus.”
15
Mundi, i.e., the universe; see above.
16
The best reading is “vobis credi;” this is one of Tertullian’s “final infinitives.”
17
Compare Augustine, de Civit. Dei, vii. 6, 23, 24, 28.
18
Formam.
19
Ratione.
20
Motatorem.
21
Alia sane vanitate.