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Against Praxeas

Tertullian

Chapter 10

About this work

A polemical Latin treatise opposing a modalist account of God and articulating distinctions among Father, Son, and Spirit while insisting on divine unity and the reality of Christ’s incarnation.

Author: Tertullian
Date: Early 3rd century
Origin: Carthage, North Africa
Genre: Theological Treatise

Chapter X.—The Very Names of Father and Son Prove the Personal Distinction of the Two. They Cannot Possibly Be Identical, Nor is Their Identity Necessary to Preserve the Divine Monarchy.

So it is either the Father or the Son

‹ Chapter 9 Chapter 11 ›

,

and

the

day

is

not

the

same

as

the

night

;

nor

is

the

Father

the

same

as

the

Son

,

in

such

a

way

that

Both

of

them

should

be

One

,

and

One

or

the

Other

should

be

Both

,

—

an

opinion

which

the

most

conceited

“

Monarchians

”

maintain

.

He

Himself

,

they

say

,

made

Himself

a

Son

to

Himself

.

Now

a

Father

makes

a

Son

,

and

a

Son

makes

a

Father

;

and

they

who

thus

become

reciprocally

of

each

other

to

each

other

cannot

in

any

way

by

themselves

simply

become

so

themselves

,

that

the

Father

can

make

Himself

a

Son

to

Himself

,

and

the

Son

render

Himself

a

Father

to

Himself

.

And

the

relations

which

God

establishes

,

them

does

He

also

guard

.

A

father

must

needs

have

a

son

,

in

order

to

be

a

father

;

so

likewise

a

son

,

to

be

a

son

,

must

have

a

father

.

It

is

,

however

,

one

thing

to

have

,

and

another

thing

to

be

.

For

instance

,

in

order

to

be

a

husband

,

I

must

have

a

wife

;

I

can

never

myself

be

my

own

wife

.

In

like

manner

,

in

order

to

be

a

father

,

I

have

a

son

,

for

I

never

can

be

a

son

to

myself

;

and

in

order

to

be

a

son

,

I

have

a

father

,

it

being

impossible

for

me

ever

to

be

my

own

father

.

And

it

is

these

relations

which

make

me

(

what

I

am

)

,

when

I

come

to

possess

them

:

I

shall

then

be

a

father

,

when

I

have

a

son

;

and

a

son

,

when

I

have

a

father

.

Now

,

if

I

am

to

be

to

myself

any

one

of

these

relations

,

I

no

longer

have

what

I

am

myself

to

be

:

neither

a

father

,

because

I

am

to

be

my

own

father

;

nor

a

son

,

because

I

shall

be

my

own

son

.

Moreover

,

inasmuch

as

I

ought

to

have

one

of

these

relations

in

order

to

be

the

other

;

so

,

if

I

am

to

be

both

together

,

I

shall

fail

to

be

one

while

I

possess

not

the

other

.

For

if

I

must

be

myself

my

son

,

who

am

also

a

father

,

I

now

cease

to

have

a

son

,

since

I

am

my

own

son

.

But

by

reason

of

not

having

a

son

,

since

I

am

my

own

son

,

how

can

I

be

a

father

?

For

I

ought

to

have

a

son

,

in

order

to

be

a

father

.

Therefore

I

am

not

a

son

,

because

I

have

not

a

father

,

who

makes

a

son

.

In

like

manner

,

if

I

am

myself

my

father

,

who

am

also

a

son

,

I

no

longer

have

a

father

,

but

am

myself

my

father

.

By

not

having

a

father

,

however

,

since

I

am

my

own

father

,

how

can

I

be

a

son

?

For

I

ought

to

have

a

father

,

in

order

to

be

a

son

.

I

cannot

therefore

be

a

father

,

because

I

have

not

a

son

,

who

makes

a

father

.

Now

all

this

must

be

the

device

of

the

devil

—

this

excluding

and

severing

one

from

the

other

—

since

by

including

both

together

in

one

under

pretence

of

the

Monarchy

,

he

causes

neither

to

be

held

and

acknowledged

,

so

that

He

is

not

the

Father

,

since

indeed

He

has

not

the

Son

;

neither

is

He

the

Son

,

since

in

like

manner

He

has

not

the

Father

:

for

while

He

is

the

Father

,

He

will

not

be

the

Son

.

In

this

way

they

hold

the

Monarchy

,

but

they

hold

neither

the

Father

nor

the

Son

.

Well

,

but

“

with

God

nothing

is

impossible

.

”

True

enough

;

who

can

be

ignorant

of

it

?

Who

also

can

be

unaware

that

“

the

things

which

are

impossible

with

men

are

possible

with

God

?

”

“

The

foolish

things

also

of

the

world

hath

God

chosen

to

confound

the

things

which

are

wise

.

”

We

have

read

it

all

.

Therefore

,

they

argue

,

it

was

not

difficult

for

God

to

make

Himself

both

a

Father

and

a

Son

,

contrary

to

the

condition

of

things

among

men

.

For

a

barren

woman

to

have

a

child

against

nature

was

no

difficulty

with

God

;

nor

was

it

for

a

virgin

to

conceive

.

Of

course

nothing

is

“

too

hard

for

the

Lord

.

”

But

if

we

choose

to

apply

this

principle

so

extravagantly

and

harshly

in

our

capricious

imaginations

,

we

may

then

make

out

God

to

have

done

anything

we

please

,

on

the

ground

that

it

was

not

impossible

for

Him

to

do

it

.

We

must

not

,

however

,

because

He

is

able

to

do

all

things

suppose

that

He

has

actually

done

what

He

has

not

done

.

But

we

must

inquire

whether

He

has

really

done

it

.

God

could

,

if

He

had

liked

,

have

furnished

man

with

wings

to

fly

with

,

just

as

He

gave

wings

to

kites

.

We

must

not

,

however

,

run

to

the

conclusion

that

He

did

this

because

He

was

able

to

do

it

.

He

might

also

have

extinguished

Praxeas

and

all

other

heretics

at

once

;

it

does

not

follow

,

however

,

that

He

did

,

simply

because

He

was

able

.

For

it

was

necessary

that

there

should

be

both

kites

and

heretics

;

it

was

necessary

also

that

the

Father

should

be

crucified

.

In

one

sense

there

will

be

something

difficult

even

for

God

—

namely

,

that

which

He

has

not

done

—

not

because

He

could

not

,

but

because

He

would

not

,

do

it

.

For

with

God

,

to

be

willing

is

to

be

able

,

and

to

be

unwilling

is

to

be

unable

;

all

that

He

has

willed

,

however

,

He

has

both

been

able

to

accomplish

,

and

has

displayed

His

ability

.

Since

,

therefore

,

if

God

had

wished

to

make

Himself

a

Son

to

Himself

,

He

had

it

in

His

power

to

do

so

;

and

since

,

if

He

had

it

in

His

power

,

He

effected

His

purpose

,

you

will

then

make

good

your

proof

of

His

power

and

His

will

(

to

do

even

this

)

when

you

shall

have

proved

to

us

that

He

actually

did

it

.

Notes

1
[Kaye, p. 507, note 3.]
2
As correlatives, one implying the existence of the other.
3
Matt. xix. 26.
4
Luke xviii. 27.
5
1 Cor. i. 27.
6
Gen. xviii. 14.
7
An ironical reference to a great paradox in the Praxean heresy.