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The Five Books Against Marcion

Tertullian

Book 1 · Chapter 26

About this work

A sustained refutation of Marcion’s theology and edited Scriptures, defending the unity of the Creator and Christ’s Father and reading the Gospel and Pauline letters against Marcionite claims.

Author: Tertullian
Date: Early 3rd century
Origin: Carthage, North Africa
Genre: Heresiology

Chapter XXVI.—In the Attribute of Justice, Marcion’s God is Hopelessly Weak and Ungodlike. He Dislikes Evil, But Does Not Punish Its Perpetration.

But it is here sufficient that the extreme

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perversity

of

their

god

is

proved

from

the

mere

exposition

of

his

lonely

goodness

,

in

which

they

refuse

to

ascribe

to

him

such

emotions

of

mind

as

they

censure

in

the

Creator

.

Now

,

if

he

is

susceptible

of

no

feeling

of

rivalry

,

or

anger

,

or

damage

,

or

injury

,

as

one

who

refrains

from

exercising

judicial

power

,

I

cannot

tell

how

any

system

of

discipline

—

and

that

,

too

,

a

plenary

one

—

can

be

consistent

in

him

.

For

how

is

it

possible

that

he

should

issue

commands

,

if

he

does

not

mean

to

execute

them

;

or

forbid

sins

,

if

he

intends

not

to

punish

them

,

but

rather

to

decline

the

functions

of

the

judge

,

as

being

a

stranger

to

all

notions

of

severity

and

judicial

chastisement

?

For

why

does

he

forbid

the

commission

of

that

which

he

punishes

not

when

perpetrated

?

It

would

have

been

far

more

right

,

if

he

had

not

forbidden

what

he

meant

not

to

punish

,

than

that

he

should

punish

what

he

had

not

forbidden

.

Nay

,

it

was

his

duty

even

to

have

permitted

what

he

was

about

to

prohibit

in

so

unreasonable

a

way

,

as

to

annex

no

penalty

to

the

offence

.

For

even

now

that

is

tacitly

permitted

which

is

forbidden

without

any

infliction

of

vengeance

.

Besides

,

he

only

forbids

the

commission

of

that

which

he

does

not

like

to

have

done

.

Most

listless

,

therefore

,

is

he

,

since

he

takes

no

offence

at

the

doing

of

what

he

dislikes

to

be

done

,

although

displeasure

ought

to

be

the

companion

of

his

violated

will

.

Now

,

if

he

is

offended

,

he

ought

to

be

angry

;

if

angry

,

he

ought

to

inflict

punishment

.

For

such

infliction

is

the

just

fruit

of

anger

,

and

anger

is

the

debt

of

displeasure

,

and

displeasure

(

as

I

have

said

)

is

the

companion

of

a

violated

will

.

However

,

he

inflicts

no

punishment

;

therefore

he

takes

no

offence

.

He takes no offence, therefore his will is not wronged, although that is done which he was unwilling to have done; and the transgression is now committed with the acquiescence of his will, because whatever offends not the will is not committed against the will. Now, if this is to be the principle of the divine virtue or goodness, to be unwilling indeed that a thing be done and to prohibit it, and yet not be moved by its commission, we then allege that he has been moved already when he declared his unwillingness; and that it is vain for him not to be moved by the accomplishment of a thing after being moved at the possibility thereof, when he willed it not to be done. For he prohibited it by his not willing it. Did he not therefore do a judicial act, when he declared his unwillingness, and consequent prohibition of it? For he judged that it ought not to be done, and he deliberately declared that it should be forbidden. Consequently by this time even he performs the part of a judge. If it is unbecoming for God to discharge a judicial function, or at least only so far becoming that He may merely declare His unwillingness, and pronounce His prohibition, then He may not even punish for an offence when it is committed. Now, nothing is so unworthy of the Divine Being as not to execute retribution on what He has disliked and forbidden. First, He owes the infliction of chastisement to whatever sentence or law He promulges, for the vindication of His authority and the maintenance of submission to it; secondly, because hostile opposition is inevitable to what He has disliked to be done, and by that dislike forbidden. Moreover, it would be a more unworthy course for God to spare the evil-doer than to punish him, especially in the most good and holy God, who is not otherwise fully good than as the enemy of evil, and that to such a degree as to display His love of good by the hatred of evil, and to fulfil His defence of the former by the extirpation of the latter.

Notes

1
Ut non defensurus. Defendo = vindico. See Oehler’s note for other instances.
2
Secundum.
3
Pronunciavit.