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The Five Books Against Marcion

Tertullian

Book 2 · Chapter 6

About this work

A sustained refutation of Marcion’s theology and edited Scriptures, defending the unity of the Creator and Christ’s Father and reading the Gospel and Pauline letters against Marcionite claims.

Author: Tertullian
Date: Early 3rd century
Origin: Carthage, North Africa
Genre: Heresiology

Chapter VI.—This Liberty Vindicated in Respect of Its Original Creation; Suitable Also for Exhibiting the Goodness and the Purpose of God. Reward and Punishment Impossible If Man Were Good or Evil Through Necessity and Not Choice.

But although we shall be understood, from

‹ Book 2 · Chapter 5 Book 2 · Chapter 7 ›

our

argument

,

to

be

only

so

affirming

man’s

unshackled

power

over

his

will

,

that

what

happens

to

him

should

be

laid

to

his

own

charge

,

and

not

to

God’s

,

yet

that

you

may

not

object

,

even

now

,

that

he

ought

not

to

have

been

so

constituted

,

since

his

liberty

and

power

of

will

might

turn

out

to

be

injurious

,

I

will

first

of

all

maintain

that

he

was

rightly

so

constituted

,

that

I

may

with

the

greater

confidence

commend

both

his

actual

constitution

,

and

the

additional

fact

of

its

being

worthy

of

the

Divine

Being

;

the

cause

which

led

to

man’s

being

created

with

such

a

constitution

being

shown

to

be

the

better

one

.

Moreover

,

man

thus

constituted

will

be

protected

by

both

the

goodness

of

God

and

by

His

purpose

,

both

of

which

are

always

found

in

concert

in

our

God

.

For

His

purpose

is

no

purpose

without

goodness

;

nor

is

His

goodness

without

a

purpose

,

except

forsooth

in

the

case

of

Marcion’s

god

,

who

is

purposelessly

good

,

as

we

have

shown

.

Well

,

then

,

it

was

proper

that

God

should

be

known

;

it

was

no

doubt

a

good

and

reasonable

thing

.

Proper

also

was

it

that

there

should

be

something

worthy

of

knowing

God

.

What

could

be

found

so

worthy

as

the

image

and

likeness

of

God

?

This

also

was

undoubtedly

good

and

reasonable

.

Therefore

it

was

proper

that

(

he

who

is

)

the

image

and

likeness

of

God

should

be

formed

with

a

free

will

and

a

mastery

of

himself

;

so

that

this

very

thing

—

namely

,

freedom

of

will

and

self

-

command

—

might

be

reckoned

as

the

image

and

likeness

of

God

in

him

.

For

this

purpose

such

an

essence

was

adapted

to

man

as

suited

this

character

,

even

the

afflatus

of

the

Deity

,

Himself

free

and

uncontrolled

.

But

if

you

will

take

some

other

view

of

the

case

,

how

came

it

to

pass

that

man

,

when

in

possession

of

the

whole

world

,

did

not

above

all

things

reign

in

self

-

possession

—

a

master

over

others

,

a

slave

to

himself

?

The

goodness

of

God

,

then

,

you

can

learn

from

His

gracious

gift

to

man

,

and

His

purpose

from

His

disposal

of

all

things

.

At

present

,

let

God’s

goodness

alone

occupy

our

attention

,

that

which

gave

so

large

a

gift

to

man

,

even

the

liberty

of

his

will

.

God’s

purpose

claims

some

other

opportunity

of

treatment

,

offering

as

it

does

instruction

of

like

import

.

Now

,

God

alone

is

good

by

nature

.

For

He

,

who

has

that

which

is

without

beginning

,

has

it

not

by

creation

,

but

by

nature

.

Man

,

however

,

who

exists

entirely

by

creation

,

having

a

beginning

,

along

with

that

beginning

obtained

the

form

in

which

he

exists

;

and

thus

he

is

not

by

nature

disposed

to

good

,

but

by

creation

,

not

having

it

as

his

own

attribute

to

be

good

,

because

,

(

as

we

have

said

,

)

it

is

not

by

nature

,

but

by

creation

,

that

he

is

disposed

to

good

,

according

to

the

appointment

of

his

good

Creator

,

even

the

Author

of

all

good

.

In

order

,

therefore

,

that

man

might

have

a

goodness

of

his

own

,

bestowed

on

him

by

God

,

and

there

might

be

henceforth

in

man

a

property

,

and

in

a

certain

sense

a

natural

attribute

of

goodness

,

there

was

assigned

to

him

in

the

constitution

of

his

nature

,

as

a

formal

witness

of

the

goodness

which

God

bestowed

upon

him

,

freedom

and

power

of

the

will

,

such

as

should

cause

good

to

be

performed

spontaneously

by

man

,

as

a

property

of

his

own

,

on

the

ground

that

no

less

than

this

would

be

required

in

the

matter

of

a

goodness

which

was

to

be

voluntarily

exercised

by

him

,

that

is

to

say

,

by

the

liberty

of

his

will

,

without

either

favour

or

servility

to

the

constitution

of

his

nature

,

so

that

man

should

be

good

just

up

to

this

point

,

if

he

should

display

his

goodness

in

accordance

with

his

natural

constitution

indeed

,

but

still

as

the

result

of

his

will

,

as

a

property

of

his

nature

;

and

,

by

a

similar

exercise

of

volition

,

should

show

himself

to

be

too

strong

in

defence

against

evil

also

(

for

even

this

God

,

of

course

,

foresaw

)

,

being

free

,

and

master

of

himself

;

because

,

if

he

were

wanting

in

this

prerogative

of

self

-

mastery

,

so

as

to

perform

even

good

by

necessity

and

not

will

,

he

would

,

in

the

helplessness

of

his

servitude

,

become

subject

to

the

usurpation

of

evil

,

a

slave

as

much

to

evil

as

to

good

.

Entire

freedom

of

will

,

therefore

,

was

conferred

upon

him

in

both

tendencies

;

so

that

,

as

master

of

himself

,

he

might

constantly

encounter

good

by

spontaneous

observance

of

it

,

and

evil

by

its

spontaneous

avoidance

;

because

,

were

man

even

otherwise

circumstanced

,

it

was

yet

his

bounden

duty

,

in

the

judgment

of

God

,

to

do

justice

according

to

the

motions

of

his

will

regarded

,

of

course

,

as

free

.

But

the

reward

neither

of

good

nor

of

evil

could

be

paid

to

the

man

who

should

be

found

to

have

been

either

good

or

evil

through

necessity

and

not

choice

.

In

this

really

lay

the

law

which

did

not

exclude

,

but

rather

prove

,

human

liberty

by

a

spontaneous

rendering

of

obedience

,

or

a

spontaneous

commission

of

iniquity

;

so

patent

was

the

liberty

of

man’s

will

for

either

issue

.

Since

,

therefore

,

both

the

goodness

and

purpose

of

God

are

discovered

in

the

gift

to

man

of

freedom

in

his

will

,

it

is

not

right

,

after

ignoring

the

original

definition

of

goodness

and

purpose

which

it

was

necessary

to

determine

any

discussion

of

the

subject

,

on

subsequent

facts

to

presume

to

say

that

God

ought

not

in

such

a

way

to

have

formed

man

,

because

the

issue

was

other

than

what

was

assumed

to

be

proper

for

God

.

We

ought

rather

,

after

duly

considering

that

it

behoved

God

so

to

create

man

,

to

leave

this

consideration

unimpaired

,

and

to

survey

the

other

aspects

of

the

case

.

It

is

,

no

doubt

,

an

easy

process

for

persons

who

take

offence

at

the

fall

of

man

,

before

they

have

looked

into

the

facts

of

his

creation

,

to

impute

the

blame

of

what

happened

to

the

Creator

,

without

any

examination

of

His

purpose

.

To

conclude

:

the

goodness

of

God

,

then

fully

considered

from

the

beginning

of

His

works

,

will

be

enough

to

convince

us

that

nothing

evil

could

possibly

have

come

forth

from

God

;

and

the

liberty

of

man

will

,

after

a

second

thought

,

show

us

that

it

alone

is

chargeable

with

the

fault

which

itself

committed

.

Notes

1
Ratio, or, “His reason.” We have used both words, which are equally suitable to the Divine Being, as seemed most convenient.
2
Irrationaliter, or, “irrationally.”
3
See above, book i. chap. xxiii. p. 288.
4
Utique.
5
Rationale, or, “consistent with His purpose.”
6
Suæ potestatis.
7
Substantia.
8
Accommodata.
9
Status.
10
Suæ potestatis.
11
Sed et alias.
12
Quale erat.
13
Animi sui possessione.
14
Dignatione.
15
Ex dispositione. The same as the “universa disponendo” above.
16
Institutione.
17
Bonum jam suum, not bonitatem.
18
Emancipatum.
19
Libripens. The language here is full of legal technicalities, derived from the Roman usage in conveyance of property. “Libripens quasi arbiter mancipationis” (Rigalt.).
20
Quoniam (with a subj.) et hoc.
21
Bonus consisteret.
22
Ita demum.
23
Proinde.
24
Fortior.
25
Meritis.
26
Constituta est.
27
Our author’s word invenitur (in the singular) combines the bonitas and ratio in one view.
28
The verb is subj., “deceret.”
29
Sed, with oportet understood.
30
Recogitata. [Again, a noble Theodicy.]